The prosecution has a duty to disclose exculpatory evidence to the defense: Having found that the claims are not procedurally barred, we must examine whether, on the evidence presented to the district court, the State was nonetheless entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A prosecutor's duty to disclose evidence to the defense is set forth in Idaho Criminal Rule 16(a), which requires that a prosecuting attorney "disclose to defense counsel any material or information within the prosecuting attorney's possession or control, or which thereafter comes into the prosecuting attorney's possession or control, which tends to negate the guilt of the accused as to the offense charged or which would tend to reduce the punishment therefore." In addition, the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution imposes upon a prosecutor the affirmative duty to disclose exculpatory evidence that is material to either guilt or punishment. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 87 L. Ed. 2d 481, 105 S. Ct. 3375 (1985); California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485, 81 L. Ed. 2d 413, 104 S. Ct. 2528 (1984); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215, 83 S. Ct. 1194 (1963); State v. Dopp, 129 Idaho 597, 605-06, 930 P.2d 1039, 1047-48 (Ct. App. 1996). Evidence is material "if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been available to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. See also Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682. A reasonable probability is "a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id. In order to withstand a motion for summary dismissal of such a claim, a post-conviction applicant must present evidence sufficient to raise a genuine factual issue as to whether material exculpatory evidence was withheld. Milburn v. State, 130 Idaho 649, 660, 946 P.2d 71, 82 (Ct. App. 1997).