Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) is identical to its federal counterpart and, thus, we find federal law instructive to this Court's analysis of the issue at hand. It is not the intent of F.R.C.P. 56 "to preserve purely speculative issues of fact for trial." Exxon Corp. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 213 U.S. App. D.C. 356, 663 F.2d 120, 128 (D.C. Cir. 1980). A party opposing summary judgment cannot demand a trial simply because of the "speculative possibility that a material issue of fact may appear at that time." l0B CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL. WRIGHT MILLER & KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 2739 at 388-89 (3d ed. 1998). See Childers v. High Society Magazine, Inc., 557 F. Supp. 978, 984 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (an unsupported statement that "it might not be so" was insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact to defeat a motion for summary judgment). Moreover, it is well settled that a mere scintilla of evidence or only a slight doubt as to the facts is insufficient to withstand summary judgment. Corbridge v. Clark Equip. Co., 112 Idaho 85, 87, 730 P.2d 1005, 1007 (1986).