In People v. Jones, 156 Ill. 2d 225, 620 N.E.2d 325, 189 Ill. Dec. 357 (1993), at the defendant's trial for aggravated criminal sexual assault, the State was allowed to introduce evidence that, a few months after the charged crime, the defendant had raped another woman. Our supreme court found that the evidence of the second rape did not establish the existence of a common plan because "the two rapes were not portions of one larger crime, but rather two separate and independent crimes". Jones, 156 Ill. 2d at 239. This was so despite the fact that the court found sufficient similarities between the charged crime and the second rape to render the evidence admissible to establish modus operandi. Jones, 156 Ill. 2d at 240. Similarly in People v. Tipton, 207 Ill. App. 3d 688, 696, 566 N.E.2d 352, 152 Ill. Dec. 665 (1990), the court found that evidence regarding an uncharged armed robbery committed by the defendant bore sufficient similarities to the charged crime to establish modus operandi but did not establish a common design, scheme, or plan because there was "no evidence to suggest that either offense was part of a larger criminal scheme." See also: People v. Bayer, 160 Ill. App. 3d 218, 221, 513 N.E.2d 457, 112 Ill. Dec. 43 (1987); People v. Murdock, 259 Ill. App. 3d 1014, 1020, 632 N.E.2d 313, 198 Ill. Dec. 254 (1994) ("there is nothing to suggest that the three separate purse snatchings were the component parts of one larger criminal enterprise."); People v. Kimbrough, 138 Ill. App. 3d 481, 485 N.E.2d 1292, 93 Ill. Dec. 82 (1985); State v. Moeller, 1996 SD 60, 548 N.W.2d 465 (1996); State v. Oliver, 133 N.J. 141, 627 A.2d 144 (1993); People v. Engelman, 434 Mich. 204, 453 N.W.2d 656 (1990).