This Court must find that the injury was received by Officer. There is no other evidence before the Court that would indicate another date for the receipt of the injury. Claimant urges us to adopt and use a date of the discovery of the injury rule. To do so would be to amend the statute which specifically states "if the death occurs within one year from the date the injury was received." We do not have the authority to amend the statute, as much as we may want to make an award on this case. the Court of Claims has no jurisdiction over claims sounding in equity. Wil-Freds Inc. v. State (1989), 41 Ill. Ct. Cl. 44; In re Application of Ward (1981), 35 Ill. Ct. Cl. 398. In the heart attack cases we have decided, we have always looked for something unusual that has occurred within the job that precipitates the heart attack before allowing recovery. (In re Application of Gidley (1983), 36 Ill. Ct. Cl. 350.) No unusual job-related circumstances within a year of the death have been related to the Court in this case. If there had been, we certainly would have considered an award. The Claimant has the burden of proof in this case of proving Claimant's decedent was killed in the line of duty within the meaning of the statute. (In re Application of Lopez (1987), 39 Ill. Ct. Cl. 315.) Unfortunately, the burden of proof has not been met. This Court has been consistent in holding that the death must occur within one year from the date the injury was received and that the injury must arise from violence or other accidental cause. (In re Application of Berg (1984), 36 Ill. Ct. Cl. 370; In re Application of Waliczek (1983), 35 Ill. Ct. Cl. 929.) This Court has previously denied a claim where cancer was the cause of death. In re Application of Findlay (1977), 32 Ill. Ct. Cl. 369.