Does Limitation Period Begin When Person Is Injured or When He Realizes the Consequences of His Injury ?
In Golla v. General Motors Corp., 167 Ill. 2d 353, 657 N.E.2d 894, 212 Ill. Dec. 549 (1995), the plaintiff brought a products liability action against the manufacturer of her automobile almost four years after she had been injured in an automobile collision.
The defendant moved to dismiss asserting that the plaintiff's action was barred under the applicable two-year statute of limitations period.
The plaintiff, relying on the discovery rule, argued that, although she was aware of her initial injury at the time of the collision, she was unaware of the ultimate extent of her damages, i.e., a latent injury that manifested itself thereafter.
Our supreme court rejected plaintiff's argument and found that her action was time-barred.
The court explained:
"This court has never suggested that plaintiffs must know the full extent of their injuries before the statute of limitations is triggered.
Rather, our cases adhere to the general rule that the limitations period commences when the plaintiff is injured, rather than when the plaintiff realizes the consequences of the injury or the full extent of her injuries." Golla, 167 Ill.2d at 364.
In MC Baldwin Financial Co. v. DiMaggio, Rosario & Veraja, LLC, 364 Ill. App. 3d 6, 22, 845 N.E.2d 22, 300 Ill. Dec. 601 (2006), this court explained, "Golla and Dancor generally stand for the proposition that existence of some injury starts the running of the limitations period on any claim arising out of the same events even though the injury may further develop or additional injuries may result from the same breach of duty." MC Baldwin, 364 Ill. App. 3d at 17.
In MC Baldwin, this court did not resolve the issue of whether a claim for restitution against DiMaggio and Coglianese would have triggered the limitations period for plaintiffs claim for damages relating to the loss of its client.
Rather, this court determined that a question of fact existed as to whether plaintiff sustained an injury that would have entitled it to an action for restitution at the time when DiMaggio and Coglianese each withdrew from their agreement with plaintiff. MC Baldwin, 364 Ill. App. 3d at 19, 23.
As a result, this court held that this issue of material fact precluded summary judgment and dismissal on statute of limitations grounds. MC Baldwin, 364 Ill. App. 3d at 19, 23.