In People v. Ruppenthal, 331 Ill. App. 3d 916, 771 N.E.2d 1002, 265 Ill. Dec. 43 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002), cert. denied, 157 L. Ed. 2d 27, 124 S. Ct. 62 (2003), the Appellate Court of Illinois considered a comparable jurisdictional issue in a similar factual context under Illinois' luring statute. There, a defendant in California used a computer to solicit sexual contact with "Stacy," an adult police officer in Illinois posing as a 14-year-old female. Id. at 1003-04. The defendant was arrested when he traveled to Illinois to meet "Stacy." Id. at 1004. The defendant argued no part of the crime occurred in Illinois because he uttered the words of solicitation in California. Id. at 1007. The court disagreed: "Although the offense of solicitation is complete upon the utterance of words of solicitation, no solicitation can occur unless the offending words are heard by another person. Defendant attempted to solicit sexual activity with a girl under the age of 17 living in Illinois, and he traveled to Illinois with the admitted intent of engaging in the sexual acts. The result of defendant's solicitation brought him within Illinois' borders. As with the telephone harassment discussed in Baker 268 Ill. App. 3d 16, 643 N.E.2d 286, 205 Ill. Dec. 335 (1994), Illinois has a valid public interest in protecting minor children in this state from individuals who seek underage sexual partners using the Internet. We find that Illinois had proper jurisdiction over this case." Id. at 1008. In People v. Ruppenthal, in an analogous sting operation by an adult Illinois police officer posing as a child in Internet communications with a California adult, the Appellate Court of Illinois considered a First Amendment challenge to a statute proscribing indecent solicitation of a child. The Illinois statute provided that a person seventeen years of age or older committed the crime of indecent solicitation of a minor if the person, with the intent that the offense of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child be committed, knowingly solicited a child or one whom he or she believed to be a child to perform an act of sexual penetration or sexual conduct. Id. at 1004-05. The court rejected the defendant's argument he committed no crime by soliciting an adult police officer, stating "the fact that defendant's words were transmitted to an adult does not negate defendant's belief that he was speaking to a minor, which is the culpable act defined by the statute." Id. at 1005. In rejecting the defendant's First Amendment challenge to the luring statute, the court said: It would be impossible for the act of solicitation to occur without the exchange of words between offender and victim, and defendant's "beliefs" and his discussions with children or those he believes to be children regarding sexual activity do not rise to the level of constitutionally protected speech. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Powell, . . . 315 Ill. App. 3d 1136, 735 N.E.2d 119, 126-27, 248 Ill. Dec. 799 (2000); People v. Bailey, . . . 167 Ill. 2d 210, 657 N.E.2d 953, 961, 212 Ill. Dec. 608 (1995) (in stalking case, "where speech is an integral part of unlawful conduct, it has no constitutional protection"); People v. Williams, . . . 133 Ill. 2d 449, 551 N.E.2d 631, 634, 141 Ill. Dec. 444 (1990) (in case involving child abduction statute, the State may "validly proscribe the luring or attempted luring of children into motor vehicles for criminal purposes, although that attempt may involve speech"). The Williams court further discussed the necessarily inchoate nature of the child abduction statute: "The luring or attempted luring of a child into an automobile for a criminal purpose is in no way protected by the first amendment. . . . Once a child is taken into a vehicle and whisked away by a person harboring a criminal motive, it becomes exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, for law enforcement personnel to intervene for the protection of the child. The State undoubtedly has broad powers to avert such potentially dangerous situations." Williams, . . . 551 N.E.2d at 634. That principle also can be applied to the indecent solicitation statute. Furthermore, we reject defendant's protests that he was the victim of a Cook County sheriff's department "thought patrol" that polices beliefs that defendant contends are "beyond the reach of the legislature." Officers did not invade defendant's home during his on-line conversation with "Stacy" and arrest him based upon the contents of that conversation. Indeed, hundreds of similarly inappropriate exchanges undoubtedly take place every day on the Internet. Those discussions, although disturbing, are not illegal if not acted upon. Defendant, however, demonstrated his intent to commit the sexual acts by traveling to Illinois to meet "Stacy," whom he believed to be under the age of 17, at an arranged time and place. (Ruppenthal, 771 N.E.2d at 1005-06.)