Subject matter jurisdiction is "the power of a court to hear and determine the general class of cases to which the proceedings before it belong." Musgrave v. State Bd. of Tax Comm'rs, 658 N.E.2d 135, 138 (Ind. Tax Ct. 1995). A determination as to whether subject matter jurisdiction exists "depends on whether the type of claim advanced by the petitioner falls within the general scope of authority conferred upon the court by constitution or statute." Id. The general scope of authority conferred upon the Tax Court is governed by Indiana Code 33-3-5-2. This statute provides that the Tax Court has "exclusive jurisdiction over any case that arises under the tax laws of Indiana and that is an initial appeal of a final determination" made by the Indiana Board. IND. CODE 33-3-5-2(a)(2) (Supp. 2001). When this Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Indiana Code 33-3-5-2, an appeal is subject to certain provisions and requirements of AOPA, including Indiana Code 4-21.5-5-7(b)(4). See IND. CODE 6-1.1-15-5(b). This section provides, inter alia, that "a petition for review must . . . set forth the following: . . . (4) Identification of persons who were parties to any proceeding that led to the agency action." IND. CODE 4-21.5-5-7(b)(4) (1998). Indiana Code 6-1.1-15-5(b)(1) does not list the Indiana Board as a party to judicial review. Therefore, the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius (the enumeration of certain things in a statute implies the exclusion of all others) applies. See Caylor-Nickel Clinic, P.C. v. Indiana Dep't of State Revenue, 569 N.E.2d 765, 772 (Ind. Tax Ct. 1991) aff'd 587 N.E.2d 1311 (Ind. 1992). The legislature's specific reference to distinct taxing officials and entities in Indiana Code 6-1.1-15-5(b)(1) implies that the legislature intended to exclude any person or entity not listed. See id. Thus, the Court finds that the legislature did not intend for the Indiana Board to be a party to a proceeding for judicial review under Indiana Code 6-1.1-1-5.