In Kolbe v. State of Iowa, 625 N.W.2d 721 (2001), the Supreme Court of Iowa held that the state cannot be held liable for negligence in issuing a driver's license to an individual who caused injury with his motor vehicle. In that case, Justin Schulte was issued a restricted driver's license which required him to wear corrective lenses and not operate a motor vehicle in excess of forty-five miles per hour. Schulte had obtained his driver's license through an Iowa Department of Transportation program that permitted the issuance of driver's licenses on a discretionary basis. While operating a motor vehicle, Schulte struck and injured Charles Kolbe, a bicyclist. Kolbe and his wife filed suit alleging, inter alia, that the state negligently issued a driver's license to Schulte without adequate investigation. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the grounds that the state was immune from suit under a discretionary function exception to the Iowa's Tort Claims Act and that the state owed no duty to the Kolbes. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Iowa upheld the grant of summary judgment, holding that even if the state had breached a statutory provision in issuing a license to Schulte, that breach did not give rise to a private cause of action. Id. at 726. The court held that there was no indication of legislative intent to create a remedy for a statutory violation. In addition, the court rejected the Kolbes' contention that the common law imposed on the state an affirmative duty to exercise ordinary care to avoid injury to persons in carrying out the functions it undertakes, whether or not those functions are mandated by statute or regulation. Id. at 727-28. Relying on 314 and 315 of the Restatement, and recognizing that Iowa had not abolished the public duty doctrine, but only narrowed its application, the court held: We have routinely held that a breach of duty owed to the public at large is not actionable unless the plaintiff can establish, based on the unique or particular facts of the case, a special relationship between the State and the injured plaintiff consistent with the rules of Restatement (Second) of Torts section 315. Our holdings have been 'consistent with the principle that public employees share the same -- but not greater -- liability to injured parties as other defendants under like circumstances.' The duty to the public can either arise from a statue or from the State's obligation to protect the public at large. We agree with the State that the licensing provisions of Iowa Code chapter 321, and more specifically Iowa Code section 321.177(7) are for the benefit of the public at large. Accordingly, we reject the Kolbes' contention that they can avoid the preclusive effect of the public duty doctrine by claiming membership to a special, identifiable group for whose benefit the statutes were enacted. Furthermore, as mentioned, the Kolbes do not claim a special relationship arising out of the particular facts of this case. For these reasons, we conclude that there are no facts establishing a special relationship upon which the Kolbes' claims of liability may be premised. Id. at 729-30. In addition, the court articulated public policy considerations in support of its decision, including that recognition of tort liability for negligent issuance of a driver's license "would likely chill the State's licensing determinations" and make it "unreasonably difficult for certain segments of our society to secure a driver's license." The court concluded that since the motor vehicle field is highly regulated by statute, a decision to impose liability should be made by the legislature. Id.