Aguilera v. State

In Aguilera v. State, 193 Md. App. 426, 997 A.2d 888 (2010), the Court explained that the right to a jury trial can be waived. The Court stated: The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that, in all criminal prosecutions, the defendant shall enjoy the right to a jury trial. The Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial is applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. A defendant may waive his or her right to a trial by jury and elect instead to be tried by the court. In order for there to be a valid waiver of the right to a jury trial, however, the trial court must be satisfied that there has been an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege. (Id. at 431.) The Court explained that the 2007 amendment to Maryland Rule 4-246(b) does not require a trial court to "engage in any fixed litany." The Court stated: In interpreting Maryland Rule 4-246(b), as with any rule of procedure, we apply the same fundamental principles of statutory construction. The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate legislative intent. As this Court has explained, to ascertain the meaning of a rule: First, we must examine the words of the rule, giving them ordinary and natural meaning. Where the language of the rule is clear and unambiguous, our analysis ends. However, the goal of such analysis is always to discern the legislative purpose. . . . To that end we must consider the context in which . . . the rule appears, including related statutes or rules and relevant legislative history. We attempt to give Maryland Rule 4-246(b) an interpretation that is reasonable, not one that is illogical or incompatible with common sense, or that will lead to absurd consequences. . . . Prior to the amendment of Maryland Rule 4-246(b), this Court and the Court of Appeals made clear that, when determining whether a defendant is knowingly and voluntarily waiving his or her right to a jury trial, the trial court is not required to engage in any fixed litany. . . . Whether the waiver is valid depends upon the facts and totality of the circumstances of each case. Nothing in the plain language of Maryland Rule 4-246(b), as amended, changes that analysis. Maryland Rule 4-246(b) was not amended to require any particular form of inquiry, either about knowledge or voluntariness. (Id. at 433, 439-40.) In Aguilera, 193 Md. App. at 437, 434, 438, the Court held that the trial court complied with Maryland Rule 4-246(b) by stating: "I am satisfied that the defendant understands what he is doing in his election for a bench trial in this case, so a jury trial has been effectively waived"--or, alternatively, this Court held that any error was harmless. As to compliance with Maryland Rule 4-246(b), the Court stated: The trial court's statement that "the defendant understands what he is doing in his election for a bench trial," along with its statement that the right to "a jury trial has been effectively waived," reflected the trial court's conclusion that appellant knew what he was doing in choosing a bench trial, and, with that understanding, he intentionally chose to waive his right to a jury trial. We hold that, although the trial court did not use the specific words "'knowingly' and 'voluntarily,'" the trial court satisfied Maryland Rule 4-246(b). The trial court's finding here was sufficient to remove all reasonable doubt that the trial court considered the issue and found an effective waiver. We caution that it is the better practice for a trial court to use the words set forth in Maryland Rule 4-246(b), stating specifically its finding that the "waiver is made knowingly and voluntarily." This will avoid claims on appeal, such as that made here, that the waiver of the right to a jury trial was defective. In this case, however, the trial court's finding satisfied the requirements of Maryland Rule 4-246(b). Id. at 437. As to harmless error, the Court stated: Alternatively, any error by the trial court in failing to follow the dictates of Maryland Rule 4-246(b) was harmless. As indicated, although the court did not use the words "knowingly" and "voluntarily" in finding that the defendant's right to a jury trial had been "effectively made," the on-the-record finding that the circuit court did make was clearly to that effect. Id. at 438.