In Ashburn v. Anne Arundel County, 306 Md. 617, 510 A.2d 1078 (1986), the Court of Appeals considered the tort duty of police officers called upon to protect citizens endangered by the criminal conduct of a third party. In that case, a police officer found a drunk man sitting in a truck in a parking lot, and told him not to drive; he did not conduct a field sobriety test or arrest him. As soon as the officer left, the man drove away. Within a short distance, he hit Ashburn, a pedestrian, resulting in the loss of Ashburn's leg. See 306 Md. at 620. The trial court dismissed Ashburn's negligence complaint, on the grounds that (1) the officer had public official immunity from negligence liability, and (2) alternatively, the officer had no special duty to protect Ashburn from the consequences of the driver's criminal conduct. See id. After concluding that the officer had qualified public official immunity from liability for non-malicious acts, the Court held that dismissal of the negligence claim against the officer also was appropriate because the officer had no tort duty to Ashburn. Even if we were to assume that the officer was statutorily required to stop or detain the driver, i.e., that the statute made the officer's actions ministerial, and thus nondiscretionary, appellant's cause would still fail because he did not establish that the officer owed him a duty in tort. 306 Md. at 626. The Ashburn Court concluded that the duty usually owed by a police officer is a duty to the public at large, rather than a private duty to a single individual. We recognize the general rule, as do most courts, that absent a "special relationship" between police and victim, liability for failure to protect an individual citizen against injury caused by another citizen does not lie against police officers. Rather, the "duty" owed by the police by virtue of their positions as officers is a duty to protect the public, and the breach of that duty is most properly actionable by the public in the form of criminal prosecution or administrative disposition. 306 Md. at 628. It adopted the "special duty rule" to define when a particular officer owes a private duty of care to an imperiled person. If a plaintiff alleges sufficient facts to show that the defendant policeman created a "special relationship" with him upon which he relied, he may maintain his action in negligence. This "special duty rule," as it has been termed by the courts, is nothing more than a modified application of the principle that although generally there is no duty in negligence terms to act for the benefit of any particular person, when one does indeed act for the benefit of another, he must act in a reasonable manner. In order for a special relationship between police officer and victim to be found, it must be shown that the local government or the police officer affirmatively acted to protect the specific victim or a specific group of individuals like the victim, thereby inducing the victim's specific reliance upon the police protection. 306 Md. at 630-31. Applying this "affirmative act plus specific reliance" test, the Court concluded that Ashburn failed to establish a special relationship, because he "alleged no facts which show that the officer affirmatively acted specifically for appellant's benefit or that the officer's actions induced appellant's reliance upon him." 306 Md. at 631-32. In Ashburn v. Anne Arundel County, the Court of Appeals considered whether a police officer may be held liable to a person injured by a drunk driver when the officer noticed the driver's intoxication, but failed to stop and detain the driver before he drove away and collided with Ashburn. Relying on 315 of the Restatement, the Court recognized that in order for a special relationship to be found, the plaintiff must show "that the local government or the police officer affirmatively acted to protect the specific victim or a specific group of individuals like the victim, thereby inducing the victim's specific reliance upon the police protection." 306 Md. at 631. The Court concluded that there was no special relationship between Ashburn and the police officer, and also rejected Ashburn's contention that 16-205.1(b)(2) of the Transportation Article, which set forth procedures for a police officer who stops or detains a driver believed to be intoxicated, evidenced the intent of the Legislature to impose civil liability upon a police officer who fails to comply with the section. Id. at 634. The Court held that in order for a statute to impose a special relationship between a police officer and a victim, and thereby create a duty in tort, the statute "must set forth mandatory acts clearly for the protection of a particular class of persons rather than the public as a whole." Id. The Court of Appeals explained that a special relationship exists where there is an ongoing custodial relationship: We also note that under 315(a) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts a duty would be imposed upon an officer to prevent physical harm caused by another to a third person where a special relationship exists between the police officer and the actor. Such special relationships have been found as to: parent and child, master and servant, landowner and licensee, those in charge of persons with known dangerous propensities, and those who have custody of others. See Lamb v. Hopkins, 303 Md. 236, 492 A.2d 1297 (1985); Restatement (Second) of Torts 316 to 320. In order for such a relationship to be found between police and perpetrator, it must be alleged that there was some type of ongoing custodial relationship between the police officer and the actor. Lamb v. Hopkins, supra; see Jackson v. Clements, 146 Cal.App.3d 983, 194 Cal.Rptr. 553, 555 (1983).