Bernadyn v. State (2005)

In Bernadyn v. State, 390 Md. 1, 887 A.2d 602 (2005) (Wilner, J., and Battaglia, J., dissenting), the defendant was charged with possession and intent to distribute marijuana and maintaining a common nuisance after police officers executed a search and seizure warrant at 2024 Morgan Street. Id. at 3. In addition to marijuana, the officers seized a "Johns Hopkins Bayview Physicians medical bill dated August 16, 2001, containing the language: 'Responsible party: Michael Bernadyn, Jr., 2024 Morgan Street, Edgewood, Maryland 21040.'" Id. at 4. At trial, part of Bernadyn's defense was that he did not live at the address where the drugs were found. Id. The trial court refused to ask whether the panel members would have a bias against the defendant's testimony because he was accused of a crime and, therefore, give it less weight than the testimony of another witness. To prove that Bernadyn did reside at the address where the drugs were found, the State, over objection, introduced into evidence the medical bill. In closing argument, the State argued in part, id. at 5: They pick a piece of evidence that shows who lives there, and what you have is a bill from Johns Hopkins Bayview Physicians, a statement date of August 16, 2001. That's almost two weeks before the warrant, but it's for services that are provided back in June of 2001. Now we go back almost two months prior to the warrant being served. So I guess defense counsel and the defendant would have you believe that Johns Hopkins randomly picked an address of 2024 and just happened to send it there, and that's where the defendant lived. It doesn't happen, because you also--look, this is a bill, is what it is, and I am sure that any institution is going to make sure they have the right address when they want to get paid. The defendant was convicted on all counts. Id. at 7. This Court affirmed and the Court of Appeals granted Bernadyn's petition for certiorari "to consider whether a medical bill seized by police at 2024 Morgan Street in Edgewood, Maryland, and addressed to 'Michael Bernadyn, 2024 Morgan Street, Edgewood, Maryland 21040,' when used by the State to establish that Bernadyn lived at that address, constitutes inadmissible hearsay." Id. at 3. The Court concluded, id. at 11: Our discussion and reasoning in Stoddard determines the outcome of this case. The bill contained two significant items: Bernadyn's name, and his address. The State did not argue simply that an item bearing Bernadyn's name was found in the house and that Bernadyn probably resided at the house. Rather, the State argued that the bill itself was "a piece of evidence that shows who lives there." In particular, the State suggested that Bayview Physicians had Bernadyn's correct address because "any institution is going to make sure they have the right address when they want to get paid." In order to accept the words "Michael Bernadyn, Jr., 2024 Morgan Street, Edgewood, Maryland 21040" as proof that Bernadyn lived at that address, the jury needed to reach two conclusions. It needed to conclude, first, that Bayview Physicians wrote those words because it believed Bernadyn to live at that address, and second, that Bayview Physicians was accurate in that belief. As used, the probative value of the words depended on Bayview Physicians having communicated the proposition that Michael Bernadyn lived at 2024 Morgan Street. The words therefore constituted a "written assertion"--and hence, under Md. Rule 5-801(a), a "statement"--that Michael Bernadyn lived at 2024 Morgan Street. When used to prove the truth of that assertion, the bill was hearsay under Md. Rule 5-801(c), because it contained "a statement . . . offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." As to whether the bill could be considered non-hearsay, the Court stated, id. at 14-15: The State also relies on the Court of Special Appeals' alternative rationale, that the bill was offered not to establish the truth of its contents, but rather for its probative value as circumstantial evidence connecting Bernadyn to the residence wherein he, the bill, and the drugs were all found. Pointing to case law from other jurisdictions in which courts have admitted documents as circumstantial evidence tending to prove a defendant's connection with a location or with other people, the State maintains that the existence of an address on the bill makes no difference in the analysis. The State ignores the fact that evidence can serve more than one purpose. If the proponent of a statement claims to offer the evidence for a purpose other than its truth, but also offers the statement to prove the truth of a matter asserted therein, the court should either exclude the evidence or make clear that the evidence is admitted for a limited purpose. Defense counsel is then on notice that the evidence is admissible, The Court of Appeals reiterated the standard of review for appeals challenging a circuit court's ruling on the admissibility of hearsay evidence. There, the Court stated: We review rulings on the admissibility of evidence ordinarily on an abuse of discretion standard. See Hopkins v. State, 352 Md. 146, 158, 721 A.2d 231, 237 (1998). Review of the admissibility of evidence which is hearsay is different. Hearsay, under our rules, must be excluded as evidence at trial, unless it falls within an exception to the hearsay rule excluding such evidence or is "permitted by applicable constitutional provisions or statutes." Md. Rule 5-802. Thus, a circuit court has no discretion to admit hearsay in the absence of a provision providing for its admissibility. Whether evidence is hearsay is an issue of law reviewed de novo. (Bernadyn, 390 Md. at 7-8.) The Court drew that distinction, and in doing so focused on how and for what purpose the proponent of the evidence (the State) was using it. The Court emphasized that the State in that case did not offer the medical bill merely to show that it was a thing found at the crime scene -- a fact from which the jurors could infer that Bernadyn probably lived there. Rather, it offered the item as proof that Bernadyn lived at the residence by showing that Bayview Hospital, an outsider, believed that he lived there, was accurate in that belief, and acted on that belief. The prosecutor in Bernadyn "argued that the bill itself was 'a piece of evidence that shows who lived'" at the residence and "suggested that Bayview Physicians had Bernadyn's correct address because 'any institution is going to make sure that they have the right address when they want to get paid.'" 390 Md. at 11. The State was using the bill to show that its author, who would have reason to know Bernadyn's address, sent it there, impliedly asserting that Bernadyn lived there. The Court found no abuse of discretion, noting: "that the court questioned the venire regarding biases in favor of or against the testimony of police officers. The issue was adequately addressed by the court. Second, the court asked the venire whether members would "tend to view the witnesses called by the defense with more or less skepticism than witnesses called by the State." The question is a broader version of that requested by appellant. The actual question posed to the venire would reveal not only bias towards appellant's testimony but also towards those witnesses testifying on appellant's behalf." (Bernadyn, 152 Md. App. 255 at 283 at 283-284, 831 A.2d 532.)