In Brooks v. Lewin Realty III, Inc., 378 Md. 70, 72, 835 A.2d 616 (2003), a lead paint case, the Court of Appeals narrowly held that, "in the context of a tort action against a Baltimore City landlord, based upon a child's consumption of lead-based paint which was present in the form of flaking, loose, or peeling paint in the leased premises, in violation of the Housing Code, the plaintiff does not have to show that the landlord had notice of the violation to establish a prima facie case." The Court of Appeals observed, as an initial matter, that, "under the common law and in the absence of a statute, a landlord ordinarily has no duty to keep rental premises in repair, or to inspect the rental premises either at the inception of the lease or during the lease term." Id. at 78. An exception to that general rule, however, is where circumstances permit the violation of a statute to serve as evidence of negligence--namely, "where there is an applicable statutory scheme designed to protect a class of persons which includes the plaintiff," such that the defendant's duty is prescribed by the statute. Id. . Under such circumstances, to establish a prima facie case of negligence, a plaintiff must demonstrate the violation of a statute "designed to protect a specific class of persons which includes the plaintiff," and that the "violation proximately caused the injury complained of." Id. at 79. In Brooks, id. at 81, the Court of Appeals examined the relevant provisions of the Baltimore City Housing Code, which generally "imposed numerous duties and obligations upon landlords who rent residential property to tenants." One violation of the Housing Code included maintaining a residence containing flaking, loose, or peeling paint. Id. at 89. Based on the Court's review of the applicable statutes and statutory scheme, the Court determinated that the Housing Code did not make a "landlord's notice of a defective condition a factor with regard to the landlord's duty to the tenant." Id. The Court stated that these "provisions of the Housing Code were clearly enacted to prevent lead poisoning in children." 378 Md. at 88. Because, as a child at the time of exposure, Roy is in the class of people intended to be protected by statute and his injury is of the kind intended to be prevented by the statute, the presence of a violation of the Baltimore City Housing Code permits an inference of prima facie negligence on the part of the landlord. Id. at 80. The Court of Appeals held that, "in the context of a tort action against a Baltimore City landlord, based upon a child's consumption of lead-based paint . . . the plaintiff does not have to show that the landlord had notice of the violation to establish a prima facie case." Rather, "in order to make out a prima facie case in a negligence action, all that a plaintiff must show is: (a) the violation of a statute or ordinance designed to protect a specific class of persons which includes the plaintiff, and (b) that the violation proximately caused the injury complained of." Id. at 79. Thus, "where there is evidence that the violation of the statute proximately caused the plaintiff's injury, evidence of such violation 'is sufficient evidence to warrant the court in submitting the case to the jury on the question of the defendant's negligence . . . .'" Id. The Court added: "The trier of fact must then evaluate whether the actions taken by the defendant were reasonable under all the circumstances." Id.