In Condry v. Laurie, 184 Md. 317, 321, 41 A.2d 66 (1945), Condry's predecessor in title, Rephorn, conveyed a portion of his property to the Hittles, who were predecessors in title of Laurie. Id. at 319. Rephorn retained a tract that separated the Hittles' property from the county road. Id. The Hittles' deed to their property granted them "a 'license to use the private road from the County Road to and from the property now conveyed . . . while they shall remain owners of the property.'" Id. (quoting deed). After Condry and Laurie acquired their respective titles to the adjoining properties (after a lengthy chain of title in each case), Condry barricaded the private road across his property, allegedly preventing Laurie from accessing his own parcel. Id. The Court rejected Condry's argument that, by granting an explicit license to the Hittles, Rephorn had negated an implied easement by necessity. The Condry Court explained that a critical difference between a license and an easement is that a license "'ceases with the death of either party, and cannot be transferred or alienated by the licensee, because it is a personal matter,'" id. at 320 , while an easement runs with the land and is binding on successors in title. The Court said, id. at 323: "While the Hittles were given a license to use the designated road only as long as they remained owners of the parcel conveyed, the license did not imply that future owners might be barred from access to the county road. When the licensees were no longer owners of the property, succeeding owners were still entitled to a way of necessity, although the way might not necessarily be the same as that used by the licensees." The Court of Appeals reversed the chancellor's "grant of an injunction commanding defendants to remove an obstruction from a private road, and enjoining them from interfering with complainants's use of the road in the future." In the complaint for injunction, complainants argued that their only access to the county road was over a private road on defendants' property, and that the private road had been used "continuously for many years as a means of ingress and egress." Id. at 319. The Court of Appeals observed, however, that the evidence "suggested that complainants could acquire access to the county road by a rear route" by constructing a bridge over the creek in the rear of the property. Id. at 322. The Court noted that complainants had acquired a parcel of land adjacent to the parcel in dispute, which provided another means of access to the county road by way of a 10-foot road. Id. The Court held that where a grantee of an implied easement by necessity "acquires a new way to the estate previously reached by the way of necessity, the way of necessity is thereby extinguished." Id. at 321-22 . The Court stated it would "not recognize a way of necessity if another road to the public highway could be made without unreasonable expense, even though the other road may be much less convenient." Id. at 322. The Maryland Court of Appeals stated: "Of course, if the cost of constructing a road over one's land as a means of access to the public highway would require unreasonable expense out of proportion to the value of the land, then there exists such necessity for a way over the neighbor's land as to justify recognition of a way by implication. But the court will not recognize a way of necessity if another road to the public highway can be made without unreasonable expense, even though the other road may be much less convenient. Mere inconvenience will not be sufficient to justify the finding of a way of necessity." 184 Md. at 322, 41 A.2d at 68 .