Cull v. Wheltle, 114 Md. 58, 78, 78 A. 820 (1910) involved the suspension by the Governor of three members of the Board of Police Commissioners of Baltimore City based on "'complaints and charges of incompetency and official misconduct' against them." Cull, 114 Md. at 77. The Court of Appeals explained the Governor's statutory authority with respect to the Commissioners as follows: "'Any of said commissioners shall be subject to removal by the Governor for official misconduct or incompetency, in the manner provided by law in the case of other civil officers.'" Id. at 79 (quoting Code of Public Local Laws art. IV, 740 (1900)). Additionally, the Governor was empowered by local law to fill vacancies on the Board. The Court noted that the Governor's authority to remove commissioners coincided with his constitutional authority to remove civil officers generally: "The Governor may suspend or arrest any military officer of the State for disobedience of orders or other military offense; and may remove him in pursuance of the sentence of a Court Martial; and may remove for incompetency or misconduct all civil officers who received appointment from the executive for a term of years." Cull, 114 Md. at 79 (quoting Md. Constitution art. II, 15). But, neither the general constitutional authority to remove civil officers, nor the specific statutory authority to remove Police Commissioners, included the power to suspend the Commissioners. Accordingly, the Court held that the Governor had no such power: The language of Md. Constitution art. II, 15 itself must be admitted to be at least suggestive, for when the same section authorized the Governor to "suspend or arrest" a military officer for causes given, and to remove him in pursuance of the sentence of a court-martial, and then, when it deals with civil officers, only authorizes him to "remove" them, the maxim, "expressio unius est exclusio alterius" naturally suggests itself. There is no other power of removal of these officers expressly given to the Governor, either by the Constitution or by statute, and there is not only no express power of suspending them given him, but a striking contrast is made between his powers in reference to military officers and those concerning civil officers. If the people of the State of Maryland, who framed the Constitution through their representatives and then by their votes ratified it, are to be judged by their actions, they have unmistakably declared that it is not their will that those occupying important public offices be deprived of them, merely because they are charged with incompetency or misconduct. Id. at 79-80, 83-84.