In D'Angelo v. St. Agnes Healthcare, Inc., 157 Md. App. 631, 853 A.2d 813, cert. denied, 384 Md. 158, 862 A.2d 993 (2004), the Court considered the appropriate sanction for the filing of a certificate that did not state that any of the 31 named defendants breached the standard of care, or that any such breach was the proximate cause of the alleged injuries; nor did the claimant attach a report from the attesting experts to their certificate, as required by CJ 3-2A-04(b)(3). Id. at 635. The Court noted that submission of a fully compliant certificate was an indispensable step in the arbitration process; indeed, it was so important that, if the certificate requirement was not satisfied, a circuit court action should be dismissed, sua sponte. Id. at 645. The Court further opined that the failure to file a certificate that satisfied all of the requirements of the Act was "tantamount to not having filed a certificate at all." Id. The Court concluded that, in such case, the trial court's grant of the defendants' motions to dismiss the case without prejudice was appropriate. Id. at 652. In D'Angelo v. St. Agnes Healthcare, Inc., the plaintiff's certificate did not identify the medical professional(s) who had violated the standard of care. 157 Md. App. at 652. Thus, he did not provide enough information to support his claim, and it was properly dismissed. Id. In D'Angelo, one of the plaintiff's arguments for why the case should not be dismissed was that the evidence obtained during discovery was sufficient to satisfy the "letter and spirit" of the certificate requirements of the Act. 157 Md. App. at 648. The Court said that the letter and spirit of the certificate requirement were not fulfilled because the depositions showed that the experts did not know who the plaintiff planned to sue. Id. Also, none of the experts ever expressed the view that any of the defendants violated the standard of care. Id. In its answer to the plaintiff's argument regarding whether a certificate could be cured, we stated that we never acknowledged that subsequent discovery by way of deposition testimony may be used to cure or supplement the certificate. Id. However, the Court ultimately determined that, nevertheless, the plaintiff's deposition did not name a proper defendant and therefore did not cure the certificate. Id. The Court upheld the circuit court's dismissal of a medical malpractice complaint because the two certificates of qualified expert that were filed in that case failed to comply with the requirements of CJP 3-2A-04(b). In that case, the plaintiffs filed a claim in the HCAO, naming thirty-one defendants, including twenty-nine medical doctors. 157 Md. App. at 635, 638. But the two certificates of qualified expert did not name any other health care provider but "St. Agnes Hospital." Id. at 637. What that meant, we observed, is that the certificates from two different qualified experts "did not say that any of the thirty-one defendants either departed from the standard of care or that the departure from the standard of care by any of the defendants was the proximate cause of the injuries alleged." Id. at 635. In other words, "there was nothing in the certificates to indicate the identity of the health care providers who the experts believed rendered substandard care." Id. at 637. "A related problem," we noted, was "that the certificates said that each expert had 'reviewed the medical records and films of the Health Care Providers named in this claim,' even though it was later learned that when the certificates were executed the certifying experts did not know the identity of any of the health care providers who were going to be named by plaintiffs' counsel in the HCAO suit." Id. And, if that were not enough, "'St. Agnes Hospital,' which was mentioned in the caption of both certificates," was not, we pointed out, "named as a defendant in the statement of claims later filed by the plaintiffs." Id. The plaintiffs' contention that a certificate does not have to state who violated the appropriate standard of care, so long as the expert certifies "that someone (as yet unknown) breached the applicable standard and that someone's deviation from the appropriate standard of care proximately caused medical injury," we emphatically rejected. Id. at 646. "If such an interpretation were sanctioned, the certificate requirement would amount to a useless formality," we explained, "that would in no way help weed out nonmeritorious claims." Id. Indeed, "at the time plaintiffs filed their certificates, it was well established," we pointed out, "that the certifying doctor was required to say that he or she was of the opinion that the defendants, who were named in the complaint, deviated from the applicable standard of care and that the deviation proximately caused the plaintiff's injury." Id.