In Davis v. Dynacorp, 336 Md. 226, 647 A.2d 446 (1994), the claimant was a computer operator who developed post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) as a result of acts of harassment directed at him by his co-workers. Id. at 227-28. The issue in Davis was whether the PTSD suffered by the claimant was "due to the nature of an employment in which hazards of an occupational disease exist." See Labor and Employment Article, section 9-502(d)(1)(i). The Court of Appeals answered that question in the negative, and explained: Davis was employed as a computer operator, which entailed, among other tasks, the entry of data. According to Davis, he spent about 80% of his day entering data, and the other 20% of the day preparing paperwork, answering the telephone, and reading manuals and other publications. We agree with the circuit court's observation that "harassment by fellow employees is not a hazard within the nature of the employment of a computer data operator. . . ." We see nothing peculiar to Davis's duties as a computer operator that made him more susceptible to harassment than in any other kind of employment. We note that the legislative emphasis on the relationship between a particular disease and a particular type of employment was certainly evident in the original workers' compensation legislation. For instance, adjacent to the column of diseases was a column describing the type of employment within which the disease might be contracted. See Ch. 465 of the Acts of 1939, 32A, at 992-95 (describing, for example, that "anthrax" was associated with "handling of wool, hair, bristles, hides or skins"). Although the specific diseases and employment descriptions have been eliminated, the necessity of a relationship between the particular disease and the "nature" of one's employment still exists. In the instant case, there simply is not the requisite relationship between the nature of Davis's work and the "disease" that he allegedly sustained. Id. at 237-38.