In Dillsworth v. State, 66 Md. App. 263, 503 A.2d 734 (1986), aff'd on other grounds, 308 Md. 354, 519 A.2d 1269 (1987), Dillsworth attacked his girlfriend, saying that he would "rip her vagina out." Id. at 266. Dillsworth "put his hand inside her and started to pull and tear," resulting in a "six centimeter-long, one centimeter-deep laceration inside the victim's vagina." Id. Dillsworth argued that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for third degree sex offense. Specifically, he argued that there was insufficient evidence that his actions constituted "sexual contact" because there was no evidence that the act was for the purpose of "sexual arousal or gratification." Id. at 268. The Court held that the term "sexual contact" included a wrongful touching for three purposes: sexual arousal, sexual gratification, or "for abuse." Id. at 270. The Court noted that the three purposes were listed in the disjunctive, and therefore, it rejected the argument that a conviction could not be upheld if the touching was not for sexual arousal or gratification. Id. at 270-71. Rather, pursuant to the statute, a touching "for the abuse" of a party would constitute sexual contact. In addressing the meaning of the term "abuse," this Court noted that other courts had construed the term "abuse," as it related to sex offenses, as "a wrongful or defiling sexual touching." Id. at 270. The Court characterized these other jurisdictions as rejecting a definition of "abuse" to include a mere physical injury. Id. The Court declined to adopt that definition, and it held that the term "abuse," in the context of a sexual offense, encompassed a physical attack intended to inflict sexual injury. Id. at 268.