Emmert v. Hearn

In Emmert v. Hearn, 309 Md. 19, 23, 522 A.2d 377 (1987), the Court of Appeals held that the testator's will, which included the bequest of "all my personal property," was clear and that no latent ambiguity existed. Paragraph Second of the testator's will provided: "I bequeath all my personal property to my surviving children to be divided equally." Id. at 20. There was a dispute over whether the phrase "all my personal property" included intangible personal property, such as corporate stocks, bonds, and bank accounts, as well as tangible personal property. Id. at 20-21. Upon review, the Court of Appeals determined that "nothing on the face of the will qualifies or limits the bequest of personal property," as there were "no examples in Paragraph Second of articles bequeathed by the testator to illustrate the type or nature of the personal property given to the legatees, nor any description or location of the personal property." Id. at 26. The Court, therefore, concluded that "the language used in Paragraph Second of the will is unambiguous on its face." Id. The Court then examined whether Paragraph Second contained a latent ambiguity. Id. at 27. The Court discussed the case of Wm. D. Shellady, Inc. v. Herlihy, Ex'r, 236 Md. 461, 204 A.2d 504 (1964), where the testator bequeathed shares of Class "B" stock, even though it was discovered that he owned no shares of Class "B" stock, but rather owned shares of Class "A" stock. Emmert, 309 Md. at 27. The Court noted that in Shellady, the "latent ambiguity allowed the admission of extrinsic evidence to clarify the mistake in the property description." Emmert, 309 Md. at 27. In Emmert, 309 Md. at 27-28, however, upon review of the testator's will and Paragraph Second, the Court held that "there was no indication that the property bequeathed . . . applies equally to two or more persons or things," and "extrinsic evidence of the testator's intent should therefore have been excluded." As the language of the will was clear and no latent ambiguity existed, the Court held that the phrase "all my personal property" included both tangible and intangible personal property. Id. at 28.