In Ferris v. State, 355 Md. 356, 735 A.2d 491 (1999), Ferris was pulled over by a Maryland State Trooper for speeding. The trooper had clocked Ferris's vehicle at ninety-two miles per hour in a sixty-five mile per hour zone. Inside the vehicle were Ferris and one front-seat passenger. When the trooper asked Ferris for his driver's license and registration, he noticed that "Ferris's 'eyes were bloodshot and he did appear a little nervous, a little fidgety.'" Ferris, 355 Md. at 362. After returning to his patrol car to request a driver's license and outstanding warrant check, the trooper noticed that Ferris and his passenger "were moving around and looking back towards him 'quite frequently.'" Id. While the trooper was writing a citation, a deputy sheriff arrived and parked his patrol car behind the trooper's and activated his vehicle emergency "flashers." Id. He too noticed Ferris and his passenger moving around a lot in the vehicle and glancing back towards the officers. The trooper returned to Ferris's vehicle with the deputy, who stood at the rear of the vehicle. After Ferris had signed a citation and his license and registration had been returned, along with a copy of the citation, the trooper asked him "'if he would mind stepping to the back of his vehicle to answer a couple of questions.'" Id. at 363. Ferris responded that "'he didn't mind.'" Id. The reasons that the trooper asked Ferris "to step out of the car were that Ferris's eyes were bloodshot, Ferris and the passenger were acting very nervous, and there was no detectable odor of alcohol on Ferris's breath." Id. The trooper suspected "'some drug use.'" Id. at 363 n.2. Standing behind the vehicle, the trooper asked Ferris if he had been smoking drugs before the traffic stop. He denied it at first, but when asked again by the trooper, Ferris admitted that he and his passenger had smoked a "joint" about three hours earlier. In response to further questioning by the trooper, Ferris admitted that his passenger possessed a small amount of marijuana. After the passenger turned over to the officers a small baggie containing marijuana and a search of the vehicle uncovered more marijuana, Ferris was arrested. At the beginning of its analysis, the Court noted that the facts presented two distinct police stops: the initial traffic stop, which ended when a citation was issued to Ferris and his license and registration were returned, and the post-traffic stop detention, which began when the trooper subsequently requested that Ferris step behind the car to answer a few questions. The Court explained: "It is without dispute that the stop of Ferris by the trooper for exceeding the posted speed limit constituted a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes, but that such a seizure was justified by the probable cause possessed by the trooper in having witnessed Ferris's traffic violation. Indeed, Ferris does not contest the initial stop. The real issue lies in the actions taken by the officer after he had issued the speeding citation to Ferris and had returned his driver's license and registration to him." Id. at 369. Acknowledging that "the inquiry is a highly fact-specific one," the Court summarized the factors that other courts have identified as "probative of whether a reasonable person would have felt free to leave," id. at 377, as follows: "the time and place of the encounter, the number of officers present and whether they were uniformed, whether the police removed the person to a different location or isolated him or her from others, whether the person was informed that he or she was free to leave, whether the police indicated that the person was suspected of a crime, whether the police retained the person's documents, and whether the police exhibited threatening behavior or physical contact that would suggest to a reasonable person that he or she was not free to leave." Id. After considering the totality of the circumstances surrounding Ferris's arrest, the Court concluded "that a reasonable person in Ferris's position would not have believed that he was free to terminate the encounter with the trooper when the trooper asked him 'if he would mind stepping to the back of his vehicle.'" Id. Indeed, such a person, the Court concluded, "would have reasonably believed he was neither free to leave the scene nor to ignore and disobey the police officer's 'requests.'" Id. at 378. The Court explained: "A host of factors gives rise to our determination that Trooper Smith's prolonged encounter with Ferris was a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. First and foremost is the prior existence of the initial traffic seizure of Ferris. This pre-existing seizure enhanced the coercive nature of the situation and the efficacy of the other factors in pointing toward the restriction of Ferris's liberty. The situation faced by Ferris was markedly different from that of a person passing by or approached by law enforcement officers on the street, in a public place, or inside the terminal of a common carrier. We find significant the following circumstances: the trooper never told Ferris that he was free to leave, the trooper's "request" of Ferris to exit the vehicle seamlessly followed the pre- existing lawful detention, the trooper removed Ferris from his automobile, the trooper separated Ferris from the passenger, there were two uniformed law enforcement officers present, the police cruiser emergency flashers remained operative throughout the entire encounter, and it was 1:30 a.m. on a dark, rural interstate highway. Given the cumulative effect of these circumstances, a reasonable person would not have felt free to terminate the encounter." Id. at 378-79. In Ferris v. State, an officer stopped a vehicle that was exceeding the speed limit. During the stop, the officer ran a license and warrant check; neither indicated a problem. Another officer arrived on the scene with partially activated emergency equipment. After the first officer had written the traffic citation, he returned Ferris's license. At this point, the officer, suspicious of Ferris's actions during the stop and his extremely bloodshot eyes, requested Ferris to step to the back of the vehicle to answer some questions. Ferris agreed and, under questioning, revealed that he had previously smoked a "joint" and that his passenger possessed a small amount of marijuana. The officer then searched the vehicle and found a large bag of marijuana. Ferris unsuccessfully moved to suppress and was convicted of possession of marijuana. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred in failing to suppress. The Court analyzed these circumstances as demonstrating two separate encounters. The conclusion of the traffic stop was the end of the first, constitutional encounter. The Court noted that "the officer's purpose in an ordinary traffic stop is to enforce the laws of the roadway, and ordinarily to investigate the manner of driving with the intent to issue a citation or warning. Once the purpose of that stop has been fulfilled, the continued detention of the car and the occupants amounts to a second detention." Ferris, 355 Md. at 372, 735 A.2d at 499. The Court determined "the totality of the circumstances present in this case, at the moment Trooper Smith prolonged the encounter beyond the scope of the initial traffic stop, to be more coercive than consensual. We thus conclude that a reasonable person in Ferris's circumstances would have reasonably believed he was neither free to leave the scene nor to ignore and disobey the police officer's 'requests.'" Id. at 377-78, 735 A.2d at 502. The factors in deciding Ferris was not free to leave were, "the trooper never told Ferris he was free to leave, the trooper's 'request' of Ferris to exit the vehicle seamlessly followed the pre-existing lawful detention, the trooper removed Ferris from his automobile, the trooper separated Ferris from the passenger, there were two uniformed law enforcement officers present, the police cruiser emergency flashers remained operative throughout the entire encounter, and it was 1:30 a.m. on a dark, rural interstate highway." Id. at 378-79, 735 A.2d at 502-03. The Court held this "second" stop/continued detention was impermissible because "Trooper Smith's reliance on Ferris's nervousness and extremely bloodshot eyes was 'simply too slender a reed to support the seizure in this case.'" Id. at 392, 735 A.2d at 510. There was a clearly demarcated sequence. At the moment when Trooper Smith returned Ferris's driver's license and registration card to him and handed Ferris a copy of the speeding citation, the initial traffic stop came to an end. It could no longer serve as the Fourth Amendment justification for anything that followed. The Court of Appeals did then go on to hold that because of the coercive atmosphere attendant on the traffic stop and with no clear dissipation of that atmosphere, the confrontation between the troopers and the passengers that followed the stop were not voluntary acts on the part of the passengers. There was, rather, a second Fourth Amendment detention of the passengers requiring an independent justification. The Court of Appeals concluded that there was no independent justification for that second detention. The Court of Appeals held that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to search the vehicle for evidence of intoxication. Id. at 384. The Court reasoned: The facts articulated by the trooper--that Ferris had exhibited extremely bloodshot eyes, nervousness, and a lack of odor of alcohol--are too weak, individually or in the aggregate, to justify reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. In the early morning hours, these factors could fit "a very large category of presumably innocent travelers, who would be subject to virtually random seizures were the Court to conclude that as little foundation as there was in this case could justify a seizure. Id. at 387. In this case, the State presented no evidence that bloodshot eyes--or excessive speed--are indicative of persons under the influence of a controlled substance. In other words, Trooper Smith did not testify that Ferris's bloodshot eyes were somehow distinct from other bloodshot eyes irritated by non-criminal causes; nor did he explain how excessive speed, without any other driving irregularity, might imply a driver's impaired operation. Id. at 392. Because the officer failed to explain why apparently innocent behavior--driving with bloodshot eyes, nervousness, and lack of an odor of alcohol--established reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, the search of the automobile was impermissible. Id. at 391-92 ("The Fourth Amendment does not allow the law enforcement official to simply assert that apparently innocent conduct was suspicious to him or her; rather, the officer must offer 'the factual basis upon which he or she bases the conclusion.'"). In Ferris v. State, the trial judge denied the motion to suppress and a split panel of the Court of Special Appeals affirmed that decision. In the grant of certiorari, one of the two questions for consideration by the Court of Appeals was that of "whether an operator of a motor vehicle is seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when he is asked to get out of his car for questioning after a traffic stop is completed." (355 Md. at 368.) In that case, a prior traffic stop of Ferris had been undisputedly proper. The focus was on what happened immediately after the issuance of a traffic citation and, thereby, the official termination of the traffic stop. Was the immediately ensuing prolongation of the encounter a mere consensual accosting or a Fourth Amendment detention? The tone of the encounter there, just as the tone of the encounter here, was at all times cordial and polite. "Although Trooper Smith did not advise Ferris that he was free to depart or that he was not free to leave, the trooper testified: "I just asked him if he would mind stepping to the back of his vehicle to answer a couple of questions. He stated he didn't mind." Ferris accompanied the trooper to the rear of the Camry." (355 Md. at 363.) The State's position as to the character of the encounter as Ferris was answering questions while standing at the rear of his car exactly parallels the State's characterization of the encounter in this case as the appellant was being asked for the keys in his pocket. The State postulates that "Ferris was merely asked to step from the vehicle" and asserts that "the fact that Ferris was asked to exit the vehicle for questioning does not transform the encounter into a seizure." The State likewise describes the scenario immediately after Petitioner exited his car as one in which Trooper Smith "was merely asking Ferris questions, which questions Ferris voluntarily answered." It is in this way that the State attempts to characterize the encounter as completely "consensual" and thus not subject to Fourth Amendment scrutiny. (355 Md. at 356.) The Court of Appeals explained that the officer's purpose in an ordinary traffic stop is to enforce the laws of the roadway, and ordinarily to investigate the manner of driving with the intent to issue a citation or warning. Thus, once the underlying basis for the initial traffic stop has concluded, a police-driver encounter which implicates the Fourth Amendment is constitutionally permissible only if either (1) the driver consents to the continuing intrusion or (2) the officer has, at a minimum, a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. (355 Md. at 372.) The Ferris Court held that "the case at bar is not one where the suspect's nervousness can fairly be characterized as especially 'dramatic,' or in some other way be objectively indicative of criminal activity." Id. at 389. The Court reasoned that the suspect's "unexceptional nervousness, in reaction to encountering the officer, was simply too ordinary to suggest criminal activity." Id. The Court also stated that the fact that the suspect and his passenger "turned around three or four times to look back at the officer is hardly evidence of criminal activity." Id. at 389-90. In sum, in Ferris v. State, appellant was stopped by an officer because he was traveling faster than the posted speed limit. The officer issued appellant a citation for speeding. Before allowing appellant to go on his way, the officer asked appellant to exit his vehicle so he could ask him a few questions. It was during this questioning that appellant eventually admitted that the vehicle he was driving contained marijuana. At a pretrial hearing, appellant moved to suppress all evidence and statements illegally obtained by the officers. The trial court denied his motion and appellant was convicted of speeding and possession of marijuana. This Court affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed.