In Fields v. State, 168 Md. App. 22, 895 A.2d 339 (Kenney, J., dissenting), aff'd, 395 Md. 758, 912 A.2d 637 (2006), a police detective responded to a report of a shooting at a bowling alley. Id. at 29. He observed that above each bowling lane was a television monitor displaying the names of the purported bowlers and their scores. Id. He made a handwritten list, itemizing each bowling lane and the names displayed on the screen for that lane. Id. For the screen above lane 22, he recorded the names "Sat Dogg/Bleu/Vino." Id. Before trial began, the defense moved in limine to preclude the detective from testifying that the name "Sat Dogg," which was the defendant's nickname, appeared on the screen or from introducing the handwritten list into evidence based on hearsay. Fields, 168 Md. App. at 29. Defense counsel argued "that the name 'Sat Dogg' on the screen was an implied assertion, by an unknown declarant, made out of court, that the defendant was present in the bowling alley that night; and that the State was offering the implied assertion in evidence to show its truth." Id. The circuit court denied the motion "commenting that there was no reason to think the person who typed the defendant's nickname onto the television screen above bowling lane 22 intended that act as an assertion that the defendant was present at that location." Id. at 30. The court also denied other objections raised during trial and allowed the evidence to be introduced. Id. On appeal, this Court affirmed but for a different reason than the trial court, Fields, 168 Md. App. at 35-37: Returning to the instant case, the reason the trial judge gave for concluding that the evidence that the appellant's nickname was on a television screen in the bowling alley was non-hearsay was incorrect, under Stoddard. The trial judge determined that the person who entered the name "Sat Dogg" on the screen did not intend to assert that the appellant was present in the bowling alley. If the words "Sat Dogg" were an implied assertion of the factual proposition that the appellant was present in the bowling alley at the time of the shootings, it would make no difference whether the "declarant" of the words intended to convey that factual proposition. Stoddard, supra, 389 Md. at 703-04. The core question here is whether the evidence that the appellant's nickname was on a television screen at bowling lane 22 constituted an implied assertion that the appellant was present in the bowling alley that night, and was offered by the State to show his presence; or whether it was an item of circumstantial crime scene evidence from which reasonable jurors could infer that the appellant was present in the bowling alley that night. In Bernadyn, supra, the Court drew that distinction, and in doing so focused on how and for what purpose the proponent of the evidence (the State) was using it. The Court emphasized that the State in that case did not offer the medical bill merely to show that it was a thing found at the crime scene -- a fact from which the jurors could infer that Bernadyn probably lived there. Rather, it offered the item as proof that Bernadyn lived at the residence by showing that Bayview Hospital, an outsider, believed that he lived there, was accurate in that belief, and acted on that belief. The prosecutor in Bernadyn "argued that the bill itself was 'a piece of evidence that shows who lived'" at the residence and "suggested that Bayview Physicians had Bernadyn's correct address because 'any institution is going to make sure that they have the right address when they want to get paid.'" 390 Md. at 11 (quoting from record in that case). The State was using the bill to show that its author, who would have reason to know Bernadyn's address, sent it there, impliedly asserting that Bernadyn lived there. The Fields Court majority concluded "that the evidence that the appellant's nickname was found on a television screen in the bowling alley on the night of the shootings falls into the category of non-assertive circumstantial crime scene evidence." It reasoned, id. at 37-38: The State called Detective Canales and questioned him about what he found at the bowling alley when he responded to the call of a shooting and what evidence he collected at the scene. Detective Canales testified that he saw names on the screens at the bowling lanes and wrote all of them down on a piece of paper. The prosecutor argued that the appellant's nickname, "Sat Dogg," on the screen at lane 22 was one of several items of evidence at the crime scene that linked the appellant to the scene -- including a sweater with his DNA on it, casings from a gun that was under his bed, and a car that looked like his car. The prosecutor did not attempt to use the evidence of the words "Sat Dogg" on the screen at the bowling alley to show that a known declarant believed the appellant was present there, had reason to accurately hold that belief, and therefore was impliedly asserting that factual proposition by entering his nickname on the screen. Unlike the probative value of the medical bill in Bernadyn, supra, the probative value of the evidence that the appellant's name was on the television screen did not depend upon the belief of the person who typed the name on the screen, or upon the accuracy of that person's belief. The prosecutor did not argue that the person who entered the name "Sat Dogg" on the screen only would have done so if he or she believed that the appellant was present in the bowling alley. Indeed, there was no evidence about that person's belief, because the person was not identified. The prosecutor argued only that the crime scene included a bowling lane with the name "Sat Dogg" written above it. To be sure, the probative value of the name-on-the-screen evidence was that it had a tendency to show that the appellant was a bowler at the bowling alley that night, and therefore was present at the location of the shootings. Any item at the crime scene that could be connected to the appellant in some way, regardless of the veracity of its source, also would have that probative value. The jurors could have drawn the same inference that the appellant was present at the bowling alley from the evidence that the sweater with his DNA on it was found there. The appellant's name on the television screen in the bowling alley was not an implied assertion of the factual proposition that the appellant was present at the bowling alley, although it was circumstantial evidence that could be probative of that fact. Because the evidence was not an "assertion," under Rule 5-801(a), it was not a "statement" under that subsection and hence was not hearsay under Rule 5-801(c). It was admissible non-hearsay evidence. Accordingly, the trial court's evidentiary ruling was not in error. According to the dissent, the presence of Field's nickname on the lane 22 screen has little, if any, relevance except as an implied assertion that someone known as "Sat Dogg" was bowling on lane 22 on the night in question. But, even assuming that the evidence might be properly introduced for the limited purpose of demonstrating what names Detective Canales observed on the screen, there is no indication that the admission was limited to that purpose or that the trial court saw any need to do so. Bernadyn, 390 Md. at 15. . . . Fields, 168 Md. App. at 49. The Court of Appeals "granted certiorari . . . to consider whether the Court of Special Appeals erred in holding that the petitioner's nickname, 'Sat Dogg,' which was displayed on a television monitor above a bowling lane, was not hearsay." Fields v. State, 395 Md. 758, 759, 912 A.2d 637 (2006). But, "because it held that even if the court erred with respect to the evidentiary issue, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, it did not reach the issue." Id.