In Fisher v. State, 367 Md. 218, 251, 786 A.2d 706 (2001), the Court was asked to consider whether child abuse, a non-enumerated felony, could be a basis for applying the felony murder doctrine. Id. at 225. The Fisher Court reviewed the history of the statutory scheme dividing murder into degrees and found that its purpose was limited to creating different grades of punishment, and that it had no effect on the felony murder doctrine as it operated at common law. Id. at 249-51. The Fisher Court went on to conclude that second degree felony murder was not limited to common law felonies, but instead included felonies creating a danger to life either by their inherent nature or the circumstances of their commission. Id. at 251, 263. Accordingly, the Court held that child abuse, or any other inherently dangerous felony not enumerated in the first degree murder statute, was a proper predicate for second degree felony murder. Id. at 263. Mary Utley was charged and convicted of child abuse, in violation of Art. 27, 35(c). Id. at 226, 279. The child abuse resulted in the death of the child. Id. at 226. At that time, " 35C(b)(1) authorized a maximum sentence of fifteen years for child abuse and 35C(b)(2) authorized a maximum sentence of twenty years if the abuse resulted in the death of the victim." Id. at 279-80. Utley, who was sentenced to twenty years, id. at 279, claimed on appeal that her sentence could not exceed fifteen years, because Count II of the indictment, pertaining to child abuse, did not allege that the abuse caused the victim's death. Id. at 280-81. The Court of Appeals thought Utley's point was "well taken as a matter of Maryland criminal cause pleading," id. at 280, and thus it did not reach the due process issue under Apprendi. Id. at 282 n.19. The Court recognized that the length of the sentence could be enhanced due to the presence of n"' a particular circumstance of the offense,'" i.e., that the child died as a result of the abuse, and therefore the charging document had to allege"' the presence of that circumstance,'" and the circumstance had to"' be determined by the trier of fact applying the reasonable doubt standard.'" Id. at 281. Reasoning that Count II of the indictment did not allege that the abuse caused the victim's death, and "the general reference at the conclusion of Count II to 35C" did not "cure the problem," id., because it did not provide "notice whether the State was seeking the enhanced penalty under 35C(b)(2)," the Court vacated "that part" of Utley's conviction "represented by the sentence" in issue, and remanded for resentencing. Id. at 282. The Court of Appeals held that felony murder in the second degree is a cognizable offense under the common law of this State. The Court explained: "If the felonious conduct, under all of the circumstances, made death a foreseeable consequence, it is reasonable for the law to infer from the commission of the felony under those circumstances the malice that qualifies the homicide as murder." Id. at 262. The underlying felony must involve danger to life, which is determined by looking to the nature of the crime or "the manner in which it was perpetrated in a given set of circumstances." Id. at 263. In Fisher, the Court upheld a second degree felony murder conviction based upon child abuse. Id.