In Hrehorovich v. Harbor Hosp. Ctr., Inc., 93 Md. App. 772, 614 A.2d 1021 (1992), Dr. Hrehorovich, a former member of Harbor Hospital's medical staff, filed a complaint against the hospital, alleging, among other things, breach of contract and wrongful discharge. Id. at 778. In that complaint, he referred to specific provisions of the "Medical Staff Bylaws" and the "Employee Policy Manual." Id. at 779. In response, Harbor Hospital filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, citing other provisions in those documents. Id. at 779-80. When the circuit court granted that motion, id. at 778, Hrehorovich noted an appeal, arguing, among other things, that, in granting the hospital's motion to dismiss, the circuit court erred in relying on "the facts set forth by appellees that went beyond his complaint." Id. at 779. "Such consideration," he maintained, "is not proper for a motion to dismiss." Id. at 780. The hospital, on the other hand, argued, as appellees do now, that "the trial court could properly examine the documents that form the basis for appellant's complaint." Id. "They had the right," the hospital insisted, "to 'complete' the pleading by providing additional portions of the documents relied on by Hrehorovich." Id. The Court rejected that reasoning but not the right of the court to consider documents outside of the pleadings. Citing Maryland Rule 2-322(c), the Court held that the circuit court did not err in considering those documents, but that, in doing so, it had transformed a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. Id. at 789. That rule provides: If, on a motion to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a clam upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 2-501, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 2-501. Md. Rule 2-322(c). In Hrekorovich v. Harbor Hospital Center, Inc., the defendants--employers terminated the plaintiff's--employee's position as a hospital director when an advisory committee determined that the plaintiff was no longer competent in performing his duties. The plaintiff filed a complaint against the defendants, alleging several causes of action, including wrongful termination, and attached certain provisions of the hospital's bylaws and the employment manual. Id. at 778-79. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, submitted other sections of the bylaws and manual, and maintained that neither established an employment contract. Id. at 779-80. The trial court granted the defendant's motion, but without a memorandum opinion. Id. at 778. On appeal, the plaintiff alleged that the court erred in treating the motion as one for summary judgment because the court did not provide him with sufficient notice that it would consider the defendant's supplementary materials. Id. at 785. The plaintiff further maintained that if known, he would have contested the defendant's position with his "evidence, testimony and documents." Id. at 785-86. The Court determined that the plaintiff was aware that the trial court could consider ancillary documents, id. at 786, and that he failed to provide further information because he lacked such evidence. Id. at 788. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's decision. Id. at 801. In sum in Hrehorovich v. Harbor Hospital Ctr., Inc., a physician, serving as chairman of the medical staff and director of the department of medicine, was terminated by Harbor Hospital Center without notice and without being given the precise grounds for his termination. Id. at 777-78. Prior to being terminated, the physician had expressed to the hospital his concerns about administrative and financial problems at the hospital, including reductions in the hospital work force, particularly the number of nurses; delays in receiving X-ray and laboratory results; and a lack of effective methods of communication between the staff and the hospital. Id. at 777. Following termination, the physician sued the hospital claiming, among other things, that he was wrongfully discharged in violation of public policy. Id. at 796. In support of that claim, he cited a "finding" by the Maryland General Assembly in the Health -- General Article that "it is a priority of this State to promote the development of a health care system that provides, for all citizens, financial and geographic access to quality health care at a reasonable cost." Id. at 797 (quoting Md. Code. (1974, 1990 Repl. Vol.), 19-102 of the Health-General Article). "While observing that a quality health care system accessible to all is undoubtedly a desirable goal," this Court held that the physician's "assertion that it represents a well-established public policy finds no support in any specific Maryland legislation." Id. at 797-98. The Court said that although "personnel policies may give rise to contractual rights if they are properly expressed and communicated to the employee in a fashion that creates a reasonable basis for the employee's reliance on the provisions," disclaimers can effectively prevent such contractual rights from arising. Id. at 793. The Court explained: "Reliance on expressed personnel policies and procedures is precluded where those same policies clearly and effectively disclaimed any contractual intent." Id. at 794.