In Jacques v. First Nat'l Bank of Maryland, 307 Md. 527, 515 A.2d 756 (1986), the plaintiffs submitted to a bank an application for a loan to satisfy the terms of an executed real estate contract that required that they settle on receiving a loan at a certain interest rate. The bank first informed the Jacqueses that they qualified for a $74,000 loan, but later informed them that a mistake had been made and that, under the bank's guidelines, they only qualified for a $41,400 loan. As a result, the Jacqueses had to forfeit their $10,000 deposit because a loan for $41,400 would not permit them to complete the purchase. The Jacqueses sued the bank for malicious interference with contract, gross negligence and negligence. A jury returned a verdict in favor of the Jacqueses on the negligence claim and awarded them $10,000 in compensatory damages. We reversed, holding that the bank had no independent duty to use due care in evaluating the loan application. The Court of Appeals granted certiorari to consider "whether a bank that has agreed to process a loan application for a loan owes to its customer a duty of reasonable care in the processing and determination of the application," and determined that a duty of care was owed. Jacques, 307 Md. at 528. In its analysis, the Court found two New York cases instructive: Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922), and Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931). In each, it was determined that a party to a "contract owed a tort duty of care to the parties with whom they had contractual privity or its legal equivalent." Jacques, 307 Md. at 536. In Glanzer, a public weigher of beans, who held herself out as skilled and careful, was held liable in tort for negligence. 233 N.Y. at 239. Similarly, in Ultramares, a public accountant, who negligently prepared and certified a balance sheet, was found liable in tort to the client who had contractually engaged the accountant to prepare financial statements. 255 N.Y. at 178. While the decisions came down differently on whether liability would extend to an injured third party, the New York Court of Appeals held a cause of action in tort was available to a party to the contract. In Jacques, the Court began by reiterating that a negligent breach of contract "'itself, is not enough to sustain an action sounding in tort.'" Jacques, 307 Md. at 534 (quoting Heckrotte v. Riddle, 224 Md. 591, 595, 168 A.2d 879 (1961)). But, should a legal duty attend the contractual relationship, "'the breach of such duty is a tort and the injured party may have his remedy by an action on the case, or he may waive the tort and sue for the breach of the contract.'" Id. (quoting Slacum v. Eastern Shore Trust Co., 163 Md. 350, 352-53, 163 A. 119 (1932)). Nevertheless, "where the failure to exercise due care creates a risk of economic loss only, courts have generally required an intimate nexus between the parties as a condition to the imposition of tort liability. This requirement is satisfied by contractual privity or its equivalent." Id. at 534-35. The analysis then turned to whether the requisite privity or its equivalent existed. The Court concluded that because the bank undertook to process the loan application, a contract existed and the intimate nexus inquiry was satisfied. Id. at 540. With the intimate nexus established, the Court considered whether the bank was bound to exercise reasonable care in fulfilling its obligations to the Jacqueses. Noting an implied promise to use reasonable care in agreeing to process the loan application and the Jacqueses' reliance on the bank's judgment, the Court looked to "the public nature" of the banking business, reflected in the State's regulation of the industry and the industry's importance to the public welfare, to determine "whether a concomitant tort duty should be recognized under these circumstances." Id. at 540. Three separate considerations informed that determination. First, "the rather extraordinary financing provisions contained in the real estate sales contract, and thereby integrated into the loan application, which left the Jacqueses particularly vulnerable and dependent upon the Bank's exercise of due care." Id. More specifically, the bank knew that the Jacqueses were contractually bound to settle with whatever loan they could obtain at an agreed upon interest rate or forfeit their deposit of $10,000. In addition, the Jacqueses were subject to a dramatic increase in the prime rate of interest that had occurred during the processing of the loan. Id. at 541. Second, the Court reflected on the professional skill required. According to the Court, "the law generally recognizes a tort duty of due care arising from contractual dealings with professionals such as physicians, attorneys, architects, and public accountants. Additionally, Maryland courts have recognized that in those occupations requiring peculiar skill, a tort duty to act with reasonable care will be imposed on those who hold themselves out as possessing the requisite skill." Id. (citing St. Paul at Chase Corp. v. Mfrs. Life Ins., 262 Md. 192, 219-220, 278 A.2d 12 (1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 857, 92 S. Ct. 104, 30 L. Ed. 2d 98 (1971)). And third, the Court considered the General Assembly's regulation of the banking industry, which imposed similar obligations. It concluded that recognizing a tort duty was consistent with Maryland policy "and reasonable in light of the nature of the banking industry and its relation to the public welfare." Id. at 543. The Court commented that courts in other jurisdictions imposed obligations on banks to conduct their business diligently and honestly. Id.