In Joseph v. Bozzuto Mgmt. Co., 173 Md. App. 305, 918 A.2d 1230 (2007), a slip-and-fall case, with Judge Charles E. Moylan, Jr. speaking for the Court, we discussed the evidentiary principle of a violation of a statute or regulation serving as evidence of negligence generally, stating: There must, first and foremost, be an actual violation of a statute or regulation, not simply a statute or regulation in existence that might be violated. The injury, moreover, must be of a type which the statute or regulation was specifically designed to prevent. The plaintiff must also be a member of the class that the statute or regulation was designed to protect. The violation of the statute must constitute a breach of a legally cognizable duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff. Each of the cases we have cited and discussed has reiterated the general principle that, under some circumstances, the violation of a statute or regulation may constitute evidence of negligence. Upon quoting Section 285 of the Restatement, Second of Torts, we explained that courts may accept a statutory rule of conduct, stating: Courts may usually accept the statutory rule of conduct as a judicial rule for tort cases, even though the statute itself does not require it. In other words, courts are free to accept, reject, or modify the rule as applied in tort law, so long as the statute does not state or imply to the contrary. Id. at 328. The Court quoted Sections 286 and 288 of the Restatement, Second of Torts, stating that statutes or ordinances must clear a high bar before a court will hold that its violation is evidence of negligence. Id. at 329-30. We commented generally that "courts usually refused to adopt statutory standards that were not aimed at protecting groups that included the plaintiff and those not aimed at protecting against harms of the kind suffered by the plaintiff." Id. at 331. In Joseph, id. at 309-10, the plaintiff, an invitee at an apartment building where his father resided, slipped and fell on an oily substance on a stairwell landing. At issue in the case was whether the plaintiff, to sustain a cause of action in negligence against the defendants, was required to "prove not only that a dangerous condition existed but also that the defendants 'had actual or constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition and that the knowledge was gained in sufficient time to give them the opportunity to remove it or to warn the invitee.'" Id. at 315 . The plaintiff, however, failed to proffer evidence demonstrating that the defendants had either actual or constructive knowledge of the oily substance on the stairwell. Id. at 319. As such, the plaintiff argued that Brooks negated the notice requirement in slip and fall cases and that the defendants violated a provision of the Montgomery County Code and that the violation of the statute was evidence of the defendants' negligence. Id. at 319-20. The Court rejected both arguments. As to the violation of the provision of the Montgomery County Code--which simply stated in "boiler-plate" language that a landlord must keep all areas of a building "in a clean, sanitary, and safe condition"--we observed that the provision was contained within a larger chapter of the Code, Chapter 29, governing landlord-tenant relations. Id. at 332. One of the express purposes of Chapter 29 was to make "the contractual relationships between landlord and tenant more arm's length and amicable by removing as many areas of doubt or ambiguity as possible and by providing a specially designed tribunal to reconcile any differences between them." Id. at 332-33. As such, the purpose of Chapter 29 of the Montgomery County Code was to improve relations between landlords and tenants. Id. at 333. The chapter purported to "regulate and determine the legal rights, remedies and obligations of the parties and beneficiaries of any rental agreement concerning any rental dwelling unit located in the County." Id. at 334 (emphasis omitted). We observed that many of the provisions of the chapter concerned "contractual obligations under the lease, not the establishment of tort liability." Id. Accordingly, based upon our review of the statutory scheme and provision at issue, we concluded that "it could not be more clear that Chapter 29 generally, and the statute at issue specifically, of the Montgomery County Code did not create a civil action tort for the benefit of invitees in slip-and-fall cases." Id. at 335. In Joseph v. Bozzuto Mgmt. Co., 173 Md. App. 305, 339-40, 918 A.2d 1230 (2007), the Court quoted with approval, the following discussion of the legal effect of statutory requirements on tort law: One kind of statute imposes a specific duty or a standard of care that would not exist at common law but does not otherwise change the rules for negligence, causation, defenses, and procedures. For instances, statutes may require owners to post a lifeguard at certain swimming pools, require landowners to cut weeds to enhance visibility at an intersection, or require landlords to equip premises with secure locks as protection against intruders. If a plaintiff is harmed by violation of such a statute, courts think of the plaintiff's case as an ordinary negligence case with the same issues and rules as other negligence cases except that the plaintiff proves negligence by proving violation of the statute. But because it is an ordinary negligence case, the plaintiff must also prove causation and damages, and she will lose if she fails to do so