In Joy v. Anne Arundel County, 52 Md. App. 653, 660, 451 A.2d 1237 (1982), appellant owned a business that operated as "a junkyard, a resource reclamation facility, and a hazardous waste facility." Id. at 655. The County complained several times that appellant's activities violated zoning regulations, and eventually sued appellant for operating a business outside the permitted uses in a W-2 District. Moreover, appellant had failed to obtain a zoning certificate of use as required by the County code. Eventually, the County brought suit against appellant in the circuit court seeking injunctive relief. That court issued an ex parte injunction after documents indicated that the State Water Resources Administration had ordered appellant to cease and desist from the storage of hazardous wastes. The court reasoned that "storage of hazardous wastes without State or county approval constituted immediate, substantial, and possible irreparable injury to the citizens of Anne Arrundel County". Id. at 656-57. At the close of the ex parte injunction hearing, the County moved for summary judgment, which was denied because of a factual dispute as to what was occurring on the property, and whether hazardous wastes were actually present. The court, however, granted an interlocutory injunction. Subsequently, the court granted summary judgment and a permanent injunction. On appeal, the Court said that although a zoning violation may not be enjoined absent a showing of irreparable injury, this rule applies only when private parties are the plaintiffs . . . When a political subdivision seeks injunctive relief against a zoning violation, it need not prove damages or irreparable injury to it. That is because the political subdivision "may be considered to be acting on behalf of all property owners within it to enforce their right to require conformity with the ordinance as the quid pro quo for their own submissions to the restrictions imposed on their property." (Joy, 52 Md. App. at 660.) Thus, the Court determined that, given the undisputed material fact that the appellant did not comply with the zoning regulations and obtain a certificate of use, the circuit court properly granted summary judgment.