Katsenelenbogen v. Katsenelenbogen, 135 Md. App. 317, 322, 762 A.2d 198 (2000) vacated as moot, 365 Md. 122, 775 A.2d 1249 (2001), illuminates the "public interest" exception to the general rule of non-reviewability of moot cases. That case involved a domestic violence dispute that became moot when the circuit court's protective order expired by its own terms. Despite the mootness, the Court recognized that the case concerned a matter of public importance that warranted the Court's consideration. The Court explained that the decision of the lower court could "be construed as weakening the State's effort to respond aggressively to incidents of violence in the home and frustrating the important objectives of the State's domestic violence law." Id. at 125. In Katsenelenbogen v. Katsenelenbogen, appellant challenged the entry of a protective order against him pursuant to the State Domestic Violence Act, codified at Family Law Article 4-501 et seq. The Court held that, if the wife's basis for the protective order was "fear of imminent serious bodily harm, the fear must be reasonable and . . . the relief must be tailored to the situation being addressed." The Court explained generally: Allegations of domestic violence are very serious, and the issuance of a protective order normally carries with it grave consequences for the perpetrator. If a protective order is issued without a sufficient legal basis, those consequences frequently cannot be erased. In that situation, the alleged perpetrator may suffer unfairly from the direct consequences of the order itself, which may include removal from his or her home, or temporary loss of custody of his or her children. . . .Id. at 335. The Court then related the outcome of a protective order proceeding alleging abuse to the effect of child custody or visitation under 9-101, noting: In making child custody determinations, a court weighs numerous factors, including the fitness of the parents, the character and reputation of the parties, and the length of separation of the child from the natural parents. A trial court might consider the issuance of a protective order against one parent when looking at any of these factors. Furthermore, . . . if a trial court has reasonable grounds to believe that a child has been abused or neglected by a party to the proceeding, the court must specifically find that there is no likelihood of further child abuse or neglect by the party in order to award custody or visitation rights to the party, except for a supervised visitation arrangement. F.L. 9-101. A protective order issued by a court that states that one parent abused his or her child pursuant to F.L. 4-501 would give a trial court reasonable grounds to believe that the child had been abused. (Id. at 336-37.) Although the Court of Appeals vacated our judgment as having been moot due to the expiration of the subject protective order, the Court exercised its discretion and explored further the relationship between the issuance of a protective order and subsequent litigation concerning a family. Once a court has found from the evidence that abuse has occurred and that a protective order is needed to provide protection for the petitioner or other person entitled to relief, the court's focus must be on fashioning a remedy that is authorized under the statute and that will be most likely to provide that protection. If . . . the court believes that protection of the petitioner requires that the parties be physically separated and that the respondent vacate the home, it should not hesitate to order that relief, along with any ancillary relief provided for in the statute, regardless of any potential impact on future litigation. . . . A determination either to exclude the perpetrator from the family home . . . will, in most instances, require the court to provide, among other things, for the temporary custody of any minor children, their support, the support of the victim, and visitation arrangements. It is likely true, as the Court of Special Appeals noted, that the issuance of a protective order and the provision of this kind of relief in it may have consequences in other litigation. A judicial finding, made after a full and fair evidentiary hearing, that one party had committed an act of abuse against another is entitled to consideration in determining issues to which that fact may be relevant. Living arrangements established as the result of a protective order may have relevance in determining custody . . .(Id. at 136-37.) Katsenelenbogen v. Katsenelenbogen, 365 Md. 122, 775 A.2d 1249 (2001), illuminates the "public interest" exception. That case arose from a domestic violence dispute. The circuit court entered a protective order, which this Court vacated on appeal; we remanded the matter for further consideration of whether the order was appropriate. Katsenelenbogen v. Katsenelenbogen, 135 Md. App. 317, 762 A.2d 198 (2000). By the time the case reached the Court of Appeals, it had become moot, because the protective order had expired by its own terms. Katsenelenbogen, 365 Md. at 125. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals recognized that the case concerned a matter of public importance that warranted the Court's consideration, despite the mootness. Id. In particular, the Court expressed concern that the Court's decision could "be construed as weakening the State's effort to respond aggressively to incidents of violence in the home and frustrating the important objectives of the State's domestic violence law." Id.