In Langston v. Riffe, 359 Md. 396, 754 A.2d 389 (2000), the Court confronted the issue of retroactive legislation in the context of three paternity actions. Two men who had been adjudged to be fathers sought to obtain blood or genetic testing in the hope of overturning declarations of paternity. The men sought relief under Section 5-1038 of the Family Law Article, as amended subsequent to their paternity adjudications. Md. Code (1984, 1991 Repl. Vol., 1995 Supp.), 5-1038(a)(2)(i)2 of the Family Law Article ("FL"). In short, application of the amended FL 5-1038(a)(2)(i)2 would permit the men to challenge the adjudication of paternity on the basis of a blood or genetic test that would exclude them as the father. Notwithstanding the logic of their position, the attempts by the adjudicated fathers met with some resistance. The principal stumbling block to the use of new technology, either to ascertain the true father or rule out someone who clearly was not, was the fact that the operative amendments came after their paternity adjudications. The mothers asserted that stringent rules governing the revisory authority of the trial courts were to apply. They argued for the application of stringent revisory procedures pursuant to Md. Rule 2-535 that would constrain a circuit court's authority to revise an adjudication of paternity. This had been the holding of the Court in Tandra S. v. Tyrone W., 336 Md. 303, 648 A.2d 439 (1994), the case which prompted the General Assembly to act. A majority of the Court of Appeals in Langston ruled that the amendment to FL 5-1038(a)(2)(i)2 should apply retroactively to afford relief to the adjudicated fathers, who were thus given the opportunity to rule out their paternity. Instead of the strict revisory rule set forth in Md. Rule 2-535 with its restrictive time constraints, FL 5-1038(a)(2)(i)2 afforded access to a post-declaration blood or genetic test. The Court concluded that the General Assembly, in amending the statute, sought to negate the effects of the Tandra S. decision. Mindful of the presumption that amended statutes would be limited to prospective effect, the Court determined that the amendment was remedial and that it was aimed at all paternity claims and declarations. The legislative history of FL 5-1038(a)(2)(i)2 likewise showed the Legislature's concern with the Tandra S. decision and its implications. The Court explained that, "clearly, the perceived injustices to putative fathers in situations similar to the putative fathers in the Tandra S. case could not be remedied by legislation with a strictly prospective effect." Langston, 359 Md. at 412. The Langston majority concluded: We hold that the extensive legislative history in this case indicates that, in enacting Chapter 248, the General Assembly intended the Act to be remedial in nature. As the Court of Special Appeals pointed out below, Chapter 248 "is remedial in that it is an expansion of the equitable grounds on which a court may relieve from the effect of a paternity judgment an adjudged father who later has been determined not to be the biological father of the child in question." . . . More simply, it is procedural and remedial in that it relieves putative fathers from the effects of the Tandra S. opinion by expanding the procedure for remedying the perceived problem. In this case, it is appropriate to apply section 5-1038 retrospectively, due to the Legislature's clear intent to restore that provision to its originally intended purpose by providing putative fathers with an additional procedure or remedy to challenge prior paternity declarations. Langston, 359 Md. at 417-18. The Court held that the changes applied retrospectively to paternity declarations entered prior to the statute's effective date. Id. at 406. In reaching its decision, the Court stated the general rule: The question whether a statute operates retrospectively, or prospectively only, ordinarily is one of legislative intent. In determining such intent this Court has repeatedly stated, "there is a general presumption in the law that an enactment is intended to have purely prospective effect. In the absence of clear legislative intent to the contrary, a statute is not given retrospective effect." Id. (citing Traore v. State, 290 Md. 585, 593, 431 A.2d 96 (1981)). The Court, however, recognized that there were exceptions allowing retrospective application, noting: 1) where the legislative enactment applies only to a procedural change; or 2) when the legislation is intended to have only a remedial effect and does not impair vested rights. Id. at 407-08. The Court found that the statute in question was both procedural and remedial. Id. at 407-410. Additionally, the Court determined that the bill file contained evidence that the legislature intended the statute to be applied retroactively. Id. at 413. The Court also concluded that the Act would not interfere with any substantive rights. Id. at 420. In that regard, the Court stated: "As to substantive rights, the legislation does not grant or create any new right to putative fathers to challenge paternity declarations against them. Rather, the Act provides new methods or procedures a putative father can use to require a court to set aside an erroneous paternity declaration." Id. In sum, the decision concluded that the statute conformed to each of the exceptions to the general rule.