In Marshall v. State, 415 Md. 248, 999 A.2d 1029 (2010), defense counsel argued during closing that the State had failed to meet its burden of proof demonstrating that the defendant had distributed as opposed to "simply" purchased cocaine. Id. at 253. To that end, the defense argued that the State failed to present any evidence definitively tying Marshall to the house in which both he and the cocaine were discovered. Id. In response, the prosecuting attorney rebutted that ". . . while the State might not have introduced evidence definitely linking . . . Marshall to the home, there was no evidence that definitively linked or unlinked him to the home." Id. at 254. Marshall's counsel objected, arguing that the State's rebuttal had shifted the burden. Id. at 255. The prosecutor, however, continued attacking Marshall's position, arguing that Marshall's counsel had testified on his behalf. Id. He indicated that the defense attorney "was testifying and drawing his own conclusions that . . . Marshall was buying drugs. And . . . that there was not a piece of evidence . . . indicating that . . . Marshall was there purchasing drugs . . . ." The prosecutor continued, adding that Defense counsel himself said that, again testifying for . . . Marshall, he said he's a cocaine addict. Now, . . . Marshall did not take the stand so I ask you to take that with a great deal of caution when defense counsel tries to indicate a health problem for . . . Marshall because there's no evidence of that whatsoever. What defense counsel is trying to do, he is trying to create doubt in your mind. He's trying to disguise the facts, make you ignore the facts and shroud what's right before you. The State has presented ample evidence of . . . Marshall's guilt as to felony . . . There is no doubt in my mind to that . . . . A very fair way to explain . . . reasonable doubt is if you imagine you're doing a jigsaw puzzle. . . But regardless at some point as you're putting together your jigsaw puzzle, without ever having seen the picture, you will know what the picture is before all the pieces are in place. You will know . . . what the picture is even though you don't have all the pieces. There are several pieces we don't have. We don't have . . . Marshall's thoughts, but we do have so many other pieces and when you put those pieces together, they spell out guilty. (Marshall, supra, 415 Md. at 255-56.) Marshall's counsel moved for mistrial on two grounds. Id. at 256. First, he asserted that "twice during the State's closing, the prosecutor pointed to the fact his client had not testified." Marshall's attorney further articulated that the remarks were fairly and reasonably susceptible of the adverse inference of defendant's guilt. Id. The circuit court, however, denied Marshall's motion, finding that the prosecutor's remarks were mere "rhetorical flourish." Id. at 256. Marshall was found guilty of possession of cocaine and possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute. Id. at 251, 257. The Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court in an unreported opinion, concluding that while the prosecutor's remarks were a comment regarding Marshall's silence, they "were a satisfactorily tailored 'invited response'" to defense counsel's closing argument. Id. at 257. Thereafter, Marshall petitioned the Court of Appeals for a writ of certiorari, which the Court granted. Id. (citing Marshall v. State, 404 Md. 658, 948 A.2d 70 (2008)). Upon the Court's contextual review of the record, it concluded that the prosecutor's remarks infringed upon Marshall's privilege against self-incrimination, guaranteed by Article 22 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights and Section 9-107 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. Id. Reasoning that the prosecutor's remarks were manifestly intended to reference the defendant's silence, the Court specifically observed that the prosecutor's statements to the jury that "Mr. Marshall did not take the stand" and "we don't have Mr. Marshall's thoughts" were used to highlight the fact that the defendant did not testify in an effort to rebut the State's evidence. Therefore, the prosecuting attorney clearly was using the defendant's silence as support for the State's case. Id. at 263-64. Consequently, the Court deduced that the direct reference to Marshall's silence naturally and necessarily invited the jury to draw an adverse inference of guilt. Id. Thus, the Court concluded that the prosecutor's comments were improper and constituted reversible error due to the scant evidence directly linking Marshall to the house in which both he and the cocaine had been discovered. Id. at 264.