Miles v. Stovall, 132 Md. App. 71, 750 A.2d 729 (2000) was a consolidated appeal, which arose from two cases: a civil paternity suit and a criminal non-support suit. Miles and Stovall were married on August 4, 1983, and were married when Stovall gave birth to a child, Brandon, in January 1984. The parties were divorced in May of 1999. This Court extended the best interests of the child standard to a presumptive father who sought to challenge paternity. The criminal non-support suit was instituted by the State on October 10, 1984. A warrant for Miles's arrest was issued on December 17, 1984, but was not served until March 26, 1999. In the meantime, Stovall filed a paternity case in January 1998, stating that she was not married when the child was conceived, that paternity had not been established by the court, and that Miles was the father. Id. at 75. Miles was eventually served with both the paternity warrant and the non-support warrant on March 26, 1999. Shortly thereafter, on May 18, 1999, an absolute divorce was granted to Miles by the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, on the ground of separation without cohabitation for one year. Stovall did not appear. The District of Columbia divorce decree's findings of fact stated: "No children were born to the parties." At a paternity hearing on May 25, 1999, Miles appeared pro se. "The court denied Miles's request for blood tests and dismissed the case without prejudice, based on the presumption that Miles was Brandon's father." Id. at 74. After a criminal non-support hearing on August 4, 1999, the court found Miles guilty of criminal non-support, and calculated child support from the date the warrant was issued on December 17, 1984. On appeal, Miles argued that the circuit court erred in denying his request for a blood test to rebut the presumption of paternity. The Court recognized that, under F.L. 5-1027(c), Miles was not presumed to be the father because Stovall conceded that she was unmarried at the time of the child's conception. Id. at 81. However, the Court reasoned that, under E.T. 1-206, Miles was presumed to be the father, because the child was born during the marriage. Id. The Court said, id. at 81-82: Reading these two statutes in a way that advances the legislative policies involved<>, and construing them as if they were not inconsistent with one another, as we must, Taxiera v. Malkus, 320 Md. 471, 480-81, 578 A.2d 761 (1990), we find that the lower court correctly presumed Miles to be Brandon's father, pursuant to the Estates and Trusts Article. However, that presumption is rebuttable. MD. CODE (1991), EST. & TRUSTS 1-105. "A motion for blood tests made under the Estates & Trusts Article is best analyzed as a request for a physical examination under Maryland Rule 2-423, and the court has discretion to grant or deny the blood tests." Turner, 327 Md. at 113, 607 A.2d 935; see also Monroe v. Monroe, 329 Md. 758, 767, 621 A.2d 898 (1993). In the Maryland circuit court proceedings, Miles also argued that the finding of fact by the D.C. Court -- i.e., that no children were born to the parties -- was binding on the Maryland courts through the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution. We disagreed, explaining that Maryland's "paramount interest in protecting the welfare and economic well-being of its minor residents" permitted us to decline to give full faith and credit to the foreign divorce decree's erroneous finding that there were no children born to the parties. Id. at 80. The Court concluded that the circuit court erred, because it "erroneously applied an irrebuttable presumption of paternity. . . ." Id. at 74.