In Molesworth v. Brandon, 341 Md. 621, 637, 672 A.2d 608, 616 (1996), a female veterinarian brought a common law wrongful discharge claim based on an allegation of sex discrimination. Molesworth, 341 Md. at 626. She could not proceed under the Act, however, because her employer had fewer than fifteen employees, and the statute expressly excludes from coverage any employer who has less than fifteen employees. Id. at 628. Nevertheless, the Court recognized that "Art. 49B, 14 provides a clear statement of public policy sufficient to support a common law cause of action for wrongful discharge against an employer exempted by Art. 49B, 15(b)." Id. at 637. The Court considered the provisions of the Maryland Fair Employment Practices Act ("FEPA") and held that Md. Code (1957, 1986 Repl.Vol.), Art. 49B, 14 provided a sufficiently clear statement of public policy with respect to all employers who discriminate based on sex, despite explicit limitations on the scope of coverage of the statute. That employers of less than fifteen employees were exempted specifically from the administrative adjudicatory process outlined in FEPA for allegations of misconduct did not mean that such employers were exempted from the policies established by the Act for purposes of the wrongful discharge tort. Id. We therefore held that Art. 49B, 14 provided a clear statement of public policy sufficient to support a common law cause of action for wrongful discharge against an employer otherwise excluded from the reach of FEPA's administrative process. 341 Md. at 637, 672 A.2d at 616. In Molesworth v. Brandon, the plaintiff, alleging sex discrimination against a small employer, also sought to bring an action based on common law wrongful termination. 672 A.2d at 611-12. The court was faced with a broad statute including the Maryland Legislature's intent to prohibit invidious employment discrimination and a limitation appearing to exempt small employers. See Md. Ann. Code art. 49B, 14, 15(b) (1999). The court stated that "absent a statute expressing a clear mandate of public policy, there ordinarily is no violation of public policy by an employer's discharging an at will employee." Molesworth, 672 A.2d at 613. The court then analyzed the various enforcement provisions of the statute, including one creating an agency called the Commission on Human Relations, with powers and a mandate similar to the Utah Division. Id. at 613. While there are differences between the Maryland statute and case law and our own, they are minor compared to the similarity of the over all intent exhibited in both cases: the elimination of the detrimental effects of employment discrimination on the public interest. The Molesworth court found that the statutory scheme was not intended to exclude small employers from employment discrimination policies, but rather to "provide a clear statement of public policy sufficient to support a common law cause of action for wrongful discharge against an employer exempted by having fewer than fifteen employees." Id. at 616. The court, in analyzing the intent of the legislative scheme, found that while small businesses were excluded from the burdens imposed by the administrative mechanism, they were not excluded from the important public policy at the heart of the statute. See id. The Court had to decide whether a common law cause of action for wrongful discharge of a female employee based on sex discrimination lies against an employer with less than fifteen employees. Maryland's Fair Employment Practices Act prohibits discrimination in employment based on race, color, religion, ancestry or national origin, sex, age, marital status, and other grounds. The Maryland act also exempts from its terms employers with less than fifteen employees. The court sustained the plaintiff's right to sue her employer on the basis of "at least thirty-four statutes, one executive order, and one constitutional amendment in Maryland that prohibit discrimination based on sex in certain circumstances.