In Morris v. Osmose Wood Preserving, 340 Md. 519, 667 A.2d 624 (1995), the plaintiffs brought a class action suit against plywood manufacturers to recover the cost of replacing the roofs of their townhouses, which were made with allegedly defective fire retardant plywood. The suit stated five counts -- strict liability, negligence, breach of implied warranties, negligent misrepresentation, and violations of the MCPA. The plaintiffs alleged that each defendant had advertised its product as suitable for constructing roofs. The circuit court dismissed all of the plaintiffs' claims. On appeal, as to the MCPA claims, the Court of Appeals reviewed whether the allegations were "sufficient to establish that the defendants engaged in unfair and deceptive trade practices in connection with sales, offers for sale, or attempts to sell consumer goods." Id. at 538. It concluded that they were not. Relying on principles of statutory construction, the Court reasoned that "the sale of consumer goods," for purposes of the MCPA, is limited to a sale in which the buyer intends to use the goods primarily for personal, family, household, or agricultural purposes. Id. at 540-41. Applying that rule to the facts of the case, the Court held that dismissal was appropriate because the allegedly deceptive practices by the manufacturers occurred entirely in the course of their marketing the plywood to the builders, who intended to use it for commercial, rather than consumer, purposes. There was no allegation that the manufacturers were in any way involved in selling, offering to sell, or advertising the townhouses purchased by the plaintiffs. Therefore, the "remote effect on the sale of consumer realty was not sufficient for the Court to conclude that the deceptive trade practice actually occurred in that sale." Id. at 542 (pointing out that "the only effect the alleged misrepresentations had on the sale of the townhouses was the creation of a possibly erroneous belief on the part of the builders which caused them to include allegedly inferior products in the townhouse."). The Court observed, however, that "it is quite possible that a deceptive trade practice committed by someone who is not the seller of consumer realty would so infect the sale or offer for sale to a consumer that the law would deem the practice to have been committed 'in' the sale or offer for sale." Id. at 541. (providing examples from other cases, such as a Pennsylvania consumer's action against a finance company that assisted a pool sales company in fraudulently obtaining mortgage deeds on consumers' homes).