In Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Garrett, 343 Md. 500, 521, 682 A.2d 1143 (1996), the Court of Appeals addressed an argument similar to that now made by Parex. There, the appellant argued that the trial court erred by refusing to grant a mistrial "based on prejudicial events which occurred during trial and improper remarks during plaintiff's closing argument." Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 343 Md. at 514. Garrett involved a suit against manufacturers and distributors of asbestos products brought by persons who suffered asbestos-related illnesses. During closing argument, plaintiff's counsel made "repeated references to murder and analogies to 'Nazis' and the 'Holocaust." Id. at 518. Defense counsel demanded a mistrial and argued that the improper argument, combined with other perceived improprieties that occurred during trial, rendered a fair trial impossible. The trial court declined to grant the motion but instructed the jury to disregard the comments. In rejecting the defendant's argument on appeal that the trial court erred, the Court of Appeals explained: In reviewing the trial judge's denial of a mistrial motion, we will not disturb the ruling absent a clear showing of abuse of discretion. When trial judges exercise discretion, they "balance alternative solutions and decide which one to apply, in order to advance the interests of justice." Our first question in determining abuse of discretion in denying a motion to mistrial is if and to what extent the movant was prejudiced by the denial. "'Where the motion for mistrial is denied and the trial judge gives a curative instruction, we must determine whether the evidence was so prejudicial that it denied the defendant a fair trial; that is, whether the damage in the form of prejudice to the defendant transcended the curative effect of the instruction.'" Id. at 517-18. The court concluded, "The trial judge did not abuse his discretion when he evaluated the conduct of the entire four-month trial, weighed the improper remarks against that backdrop, and determined that granting a mistrial would not be just." Id. at 519-20.