legislative history of the District's long arm statute makes it clear that it was Congress' intent to provide the District with a long-arm statute equivalent in scope to those already in effect in Maryland and Virginia. Id. at (quoting Environmental Research Int'l Inc. v. Lockwood Greene Engineers, Inc., 355 A.2d 808, 810 (D.C. 1976) (en banc)). The legislature having focused on Maryland and Virginia, we should surely explore the construction by courts in these neighboring jurisdictions of the statutes on which our own legislation was based. Maryland's specific jurisdiction long-arm statute is identical to the District's in all material respects. See Md. Code Ann. Cts. & Jud. Proc. 6-103 (1994). The Maryland Court of Appeals has stated that in enacting the statute, the legislature intended "to expand the exercise of personal jurisdiction to the limits allowed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution." Camelback Ski Corp. v. Behning, 307 Md. 270, 513 A.2d 874, 876 (Md. 1986) (Camelback I), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 480 U.S. 901, 107 S. Ct. 1341, 94 L. Ed. 2d 512 (1987). The exercise of specific jurisdiction is permissible in Maryland if the suit arises out of, or is directly related to, the defendant's activities in the state. See Camelback Ski Corp. v. Behning, 312 Md. 330, 539 A.2d 1107, 1111 (Md. 1988) (Camelback II); accord, Presbyterian Univ. Hosp. v. Wilson, 337 Md. 541, 654 A.2d 1324, 1329-30 (Md. 1995); Talegen Corp. v. Signet Leasing and Fin. Corp., 104 Md. App. 663, 657 A.2d 406, 410-11 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1995); Piracci v. New York City Employees' Retirement Sys., 321 F. Supp. 1067, 1072 (D. Md. 1971).