In Pope v. State, 284 Md. 309, 323, 396 A.2d 1054 (1979), a three-month-old baby died from physical injuries inflicted by his mother, who poked, squeezed, shook, and beat him while in the grip of a "'religious frenzy.'" See Pope, 284 Md. at 315. At that time, she believed herself to be "'God'" and that "'Satan had hidden in the body of her son.'" See id. The abuse occurred in Pope's presence and at her home, where the mother and infant were temporarily staying. Pope testified that she was too "'fearful'" and "'shocked'" to prevent the beating. See 284 Md. at 316. She was nonetheless convicted of child abuse. That conviction, however, was reversed by the Court of Appeals, which held that because Pope had neither "permanent or temporary care or custody" of the child, nor responsibility for his supervision, she could not be convicted of child abuse. See 284 Md. at 328-30. Having earlier quoted at length from the Pope opinion, we need not now restate the reasoning underlying that decision. Nor is it necessary to even advert to it, because appellant's interest in Pope is confined principally to the following statement in that opinion: "So it is that a baby sitter temporarily has responsibility for the supervision of a child . . . . And it is by mutual consent that a school teacher has responsibility for the supervision of children in connection with his academic duties." 284 Md. at 324. The Court first observed: The child abuse statute speaks in terms of a person who "has" responsibility for the supervision of a minor child. It does not prescribe how such responsibility attaches or what "responsibility" and "supervision" encompass. A doubt or ambiguity exists as to the exact reach of the statute's provision with respect to "has responsibility for the supervision of," justifying application of the principle that permits courts in such circumstances to ascertain and give effect to the real intention of the Legislature. Id. at 322. The Court went on to ascertain the intent of the Legislature in adopting the subject language in the child abuse statute: We think it to be self-evident that responsibility for supervision of a minor child may be obtained only upon the mutual consent, expressed or implied, by the one legally charged with the care of the child and by the one assuming the responsibility. In other words, a parent may not impose responsibility for the supervision of his or her minor child on a third person unless that person accepts the responsibility, and a third person may not assume such responsibility unless the parent grants it. So it is that a baby sitter temporarily has responsibility for the supervision of a child; the parents grant the responsibility for the period they are not at home, and the sitter accepts it. And it is by mutual consent that a school teacher has responsibility for the supervision of children in connection with his academic duties. Id. at 323-24 . Finally, the Court discussed the duration of the responsibility for the supervision of a minor once that responsibility has been placed in a third person: On the other hand, once responsibility for the supervision of a minor child has been placed in a third person, it may be terminated unilaterally by a parent by resuming responsibility, expressly or by conduct. The consent of the third party in such circumstances is not required; he may not prevent return of responsibility to the parent. But, of course, the third person in whom responsibility has been placed is not free to relinquish that responsibility without the knowledge of the parent. For example, a sitter may not simply walk away in the absence of the parents and leave the children to their own devices. Id. at 324.