In Radman v. Harold, 279 Md. 167, 167-68, 367 A.2d 472 (1977), a medical malpractice case, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court improperly refused to allow "an expert witness to express an opinion regarding the manner in which the defendant surgeon rendered his professional services." In Radman, id. at 168, Radman, a gynecologist and surgeon, performed a total abdominal hysterectomy upon Harold, and while doing so, unintentionally knicked Harold's bladder, causing her to undergo two additional procedures in order to repair the bladder. At trial, Harold proffered an internal medicine specialist as an expert witness qualified to testify as to the standard of care required of a surgeon performing a hysterectomy. Id. The trial court ruled that the internal medicine specialist lacked the necessary qualifications to testify. Id. In Radman, id. at 169, the Court of Appeals stated that case law stood for the proposition that "a witness may be competent to express an expert opinion if he is reasonably familiar with the subject under investigation, regardless of whether this special knowledge is based upon professional training, observation, actual experience, or any combination of these factors." The Court of Appeals expressed the "classic formulation" concerning expert qualification as follows: It is a familiar rule of evidence that a witness, in order to qualify as an expert, should have such special knowledge of the subject on which he is to testify that he can give the jury assistance in solving a problem for which their equipment of average knowledge is inadequate. It is sufficient if the court is satisfied that the expert has in some way gained such experience in the matter was would entitle his evidence to credit. It is not a ground for excluding the testimony of an expert that he bases his statements in whole or in part upon what he has read, provided that his reading can be assumed to constitute part of his general knowledge adequate to enable him to form a reasonable opinion of his own. A witness is qualified to testify as an expert when he exhibits such a degree of knowledge as to make it appear that his opinion is of some value, whether such knowledge has been gained from observation or experience, standard books, maps of recognized authority, or any other reliable sources. The knowledge of an expert in any science or art would be extremely limited if it extended no further than inferences from happenings within his own experience. His testimony is admitted because it is based on his special knowledge derived not only from his own experience, but also from the experiments and reasoning of others, communicated by personal association or through books or other sources. (Id. at 169-70.) The Court of Appeals observed that "the mere fact that a person offered as a witness has not been personally involved in the activity about which he is to testify does not, as such, destroy his competency as an expert." Id. at 170. The Court of Appeals affirmed the reversal and remand of the case, observing that the trial court needed to determine whether Harold's expert, based on his overall familiarity with the hysterectomy procedure, was qualified to testify as an expert. Id. at 176. The plaintiff attempted to qualify an internist, who lacked specialty in gynecology and surgery, as an expert in order to establish that the defendant physician failed to perform a hysterectomy according to the appropriate standard of care. Id. at 167. The Court of Appeals, having determined that the trial court applied an erroneous legal standard in excluding the expert's testimony, stated: "In light of the fact that we have never treated expert medical testimony any differently than other types of expert testimony, we perceive no reason why a person who has acquired sufficient knowledge in an area should be disqualified as a medical expert merely because he is not a specialist or merely because he has never personally performed a particular procedure." Id. at 171. As a result, the Court concluded that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding the internist's testimony on the basis that he was an internal medicine specialist and not a gynecologist or surgeon. Id. at 176. In Radman v. Harold, a patient of the defendant physician attempted to have an internal medicine specialist qualified as an expert witness to establish that the defendant physician did not perform a total abdominal hysterectomy according to the standard of care required of a surgeon in the performance of that procedure because, after unintentionally knicking the patient's bladder, it was not until the third operation to repair the patient's bladder that the problem was finally eliminated. Concluding that the trial judge applied an erroneous legal standard in excluding the testimony of the expert witness, the Court of Appeals reasoned: "We do not agree entirely with the court's first reason, that the witness could not qualify as an expert in the flooring trade as he had never previously laid a floor. A witness may qualify if he or she possesses special and sufficient knowledge regardless of whether such knowledge was obtained from study, observation or experience. A law professor may be an expert on trial procedure even though he or she has never tried a case. There are many expert astronauts who have yet to make a space flight." In sum, in Radman v. Harold, female plaintiff's expert was an internist who would have testified that the defendant surgeon failed to meet the standard of care when performing a total abdominal hysterectomy by unintentionally nicking the plaintiff's bladder. The Court of Appeals held that the trial judge had erred in excluding the proffered opinion based on the mistaken belief that specialization or actual experience was a legal prerequisite to qualifying as an expert on the standard of care in performing a total hysterectomy. The Court pointed out that generally, and including the field of medicine, "the degree of knowledge, skill, and experience required of a witness depends entirely on the area under investigation." Id. at 171 n.2, 367 A.2d at 475 n.2. In view of its holding, the Court of Appeals did "not reach the question whether there was an abuse of discretion." Id. at 176, 367 A.2d at 477. The case was remanded for retrial at which a determination of the expert's qualifications would be "based on his overall familiarity with the procedures in dispute, and the trial court should exercise its discretion in a manner consistent with the legal principles set out in the Radman opinion." Id.