In Rosencrantz v. Shields, Inc., 28 Md.App. 379, 346 A.2d 237 (1975), the Maryland Court of Special Appeals expressed doubts that entry upon disputed land by a true owner's agents, merely to conduct a survey, would sufficiently disrupt the continuity of adverse possession as a matter of law. 28 Md.App. at 393. Instead, the Rosencrantz court stated that whether a survey, without more, is sufficient to disrupt continuity of adverse possession must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis to discern whether the entry to conduct a survey was "accompanied by a purpose to take possession." Id. at 390, quoting 2 C.J.S. Adverse Possession, 173 (1972). The issue of whether the conducting of a survey, alone, disrupts the continuity of adverse possession was not dispositive to the Rosencrantz court's holding. However, the Rosencrantz court discussed the issue at length in dicta, summarizing pertinent case law and several commentaries on adverse possession and real property. In Rosencrantz v. Shields, Inc., the record title owner was Shields, Inc. Id. at 381. The Rosencrantzes' immediate predecessor in title, Jesse Smith, had held the disputed property by adverse possession, commencing in May 1953. Id. The Rosencrantzes purchased land bordering on the disputed property in May of 1964 and thereafter proceeded to hold the disputed property adversely to Shields, Inc. Id. at 383-84. The Rosencrantz opinion mentions the possibility that there may have been a gap in Jesse Smith's adverse possession of the property between the latter part of 1963 and May of 1964 when the Rosencrantzes purchased the property. 28 Md. App. at 384. In October 1971, the Rosencrantzes filed a trespass, quare clausum fregit, suit alleging adverse possession against Shields, Inc., by the Rosencrantzes and their predecessors in title. Id. at 383. A judgment was entered in favor of Shields, Inc., due to a failure by the Rosencrantzes to show sufficient privity between Jesse Smith and his predecessor in title. Id. at 383-85. This meant that the earliest date that the Rosencrantzes could claim adverse possession was February 1953. Id. at 385-86. This also meant, of course, that, as of the date that suit was filed in 1971, the Rosencrantzes could show adverse possession for only eighteen years. Id. at 386. After losing the first suit, the Rosencrantzes, in May 1974, filed a suit to quiet title against Shields, Inc. Id. at 381. In their second suit, the Rosencrantzes claimed that they (and their predecessors) now had held the disputed parcel for twenty years and that their unsuccessful 1971 suit did not interrupt the twenty-year period. The Court held that, while filing of the suit by the Rosencrantzes did not interrupt the period of adverse possession, the filing of a defense by Shields, Inc., did interrupt the twenty years. Id. at 394. In regard to the Rosencrantzes' claim, Judge Jerrold Powers, for the Court, said: If an action of ejectment, trespass to try title, or other appropriate action for the recovery of its corporeal estate in the land had been commenced by, rather than against, Shields, the filing of the action on 1 October 1971 would have interrupted the continuity of the adverse possession. Id. But the interruption did not take place with the commencement of the action, because the filing of suit by Mr. and Mrs. Rosencrantz was not an assertion of rights by Shields. It was the defense by Shields to the suit which constituted an assertion by it of an opposing right. It was that opposing claim by Shields which, when successfully prosecuted to judgment, interrupted the adverse possession. The only remaining point which requires notice is that, even after it was adjudicated to hold title superior to that of appellants, Shields has not physically retaken possession. Mr. and Mrs. Rosencrantz have remained as before. We hold that this failure of Shields to reenter did not impair its right to do so. At most, the appellants started over again, from zero, on a new period of adverse possession. The author says in 5 Thompson, Commentaries on the Modern Law of Real Property, 2552, at 572-73 (Grimes repl. 1957): "Possession by the adverse claimant must be uninterrupted for the full statutory period, for to break effectively the possession at any time before the period has fully expired will arrest the running of the statute. The moment the running of the statute of limitations is interrupted the law restores the possession to the holder of the legal title, and the claimant by adverse possession must begin de novo. Upon interruption of the possession before completion of the statutory period, the possession of the true owner constructively intervenes, and should the claimant resume possession, the statute of limitations begins to run at the date of such resumption, and must run for the full statutory period thereafter in order to give the claimant title. If the possession be interrupted, either by fraud or force, or by process of law, the statute begins to run only from the time of reentry." (Id. at 394-95.)