In Shabazz v. Bob Evans Farms, Inc., 163 Md. App. 602, 624, 881 A.2d 1212 (2005), the plaintiff, Wendy Shabazz, who is African-American, had worked as a server in a Bob Evans restaurant in Bowie. She alleged that certain policy changes at the restaurant that had the effect of limiting a server's ability to develop regular customers and increase his or her tips were being applied in a discriminatory manner. She complained to the assistant manager, who, in turn, communicated the complaint to Shabazz's immediate supervisor, Martin. Martin promptly fired Shabazz. Two days later, after protesting her termination, Shabazz was reinstated to her position. She continued to complain of less desirable work assignments until she was again terminated by Martin, three months later. Shabazz filed suit in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County against Bob Evans and Martin, asserting two violations of the PGCC: unlawful employment discrimination on the basis of her race; and retaliation. She sought "economic damages, compensatory damages, and punitive damages to be determined at trial, plus attorneys' fees, costs," and other appropriate relief. Id. at 614. The case was tried to a jury. At the close of all the evidence, Shabazz withdrew her claim for economic damages. She argued to the jury that it should award compensatory damages for pain and suffering and punitive damages. The jurors returned a verdict finding that Bob Evans was not liable for race discrimination or retaliation, but finding that Martin had "unlawfully discharged Shabazz in retaliation for her complaint of discriminatory conduct." Id. at 616. The jurors awarded Shabazz "0" in compensatory damages and $85,000 in punitive damages. Id. at 617. The court entered two judgments: one in favor of Bob Evans and against Shabazz for costs; and one against Martin and in favor of Shabazz for $85,000 and costs. Martin moved for JNOV, arguing that because the award of punitive damages was not supported by a predicate award of compensatory damages, it had to be stricken. Shabazz filed a post-judgment motion, as well, seeking to have the court determine and award her backpay "as a form of 'make whole' equitable relief." Id. In analyzing Shabazz's backpay argument, we considered the state and federal anti-discrimination law schemes. The Court explained that, at that time, the FEPA, then codified in Article 49B, prohibited at section 16(f) retaliation against an employee for making a complaint of unlawful discrimination. It did not authorize a private cause of action for a violation of that section, however. Rather, the FEPA provided only an administrative enforcement mechanism for violations of section 16(f). Upon a finding of a violation, the MCHR could order an employee reinstated and award backpay, but could not award damages or other monetary relief. In contrast, under then recent changes to federal anti-discrimination laws set forth at Title VII, an employee could bring a private cause of action to recover compensatory and punitive damages. We then turned to the relief available under then Article 49B, section 42(a), permitting a "civil action" for "damages, injunctive relief, or other civil relief" against a person who committed an "act of discrimination prohibited by the PGCC." Section 2-185(a) of the PGCC prohibited, inter alia, discrimination on the basis of race. Shabazz argued that she could recover backpay under section 42(a) and that because backpay was in the nature of equitable relief, it was for the court to determine after liability had been found. The Court concluded, however, that even if section 42(a) authorized Shabazz to pursue backpay as an equitable remedy, it only was recoverable against Bob Evans, not against Martin and because Bob Evans had been found not liable, her claim failed. Alternatively, we concluded that, because section 42(a) permitted Shabazz to seek lost wages as a form of damages, it could not be construed to also permit her to seek backpay as post-judgment equitable relief. The Court explained that Title VII expressly carved out backpay as an equitable remedy, permitting the court to award backpay and the jury to award "'other compensatory damages.'" Id. at 630 (quoting Corti v. Storage Technology Corp., 304 F.3d 336, 344 (4th Cir. 2002)). In contrast, "the cause of action created in section 42, for violation of three local anti-employment discrimination laws, does not carve out backpay and disallow recovery of lost earnings from recovery as damages." Id. at 631. Therefore, "there was nothing to preclude Shabazz from going forward with her economic claim of lost earnings before the jury." Id. Having made the decision to withdraw that claim from the jury's consideration, however, she had waived any entitlement to that relief. The Court also rejected Shabazz's argument that the jurors' award of punitive damages could stand in the absence of an underlying award of compensatory damages. The Court explained that the federal courts of appeal were in "general agreement" that an equitable award of backpay by the court in an action under Title VII was sufficient to support an award of punitive damages by a jury without an award of compensatory damages. Id. at 634. In contrast to the controlling provisions of Title VII, however, section 42(a) did not "make any specific reference to punitive damages" or to federal jurisprudence interpreting Title VII. Id. at 638. The Court opined: Unless the General Assembly has stated otherwise, which it has not, the meaning of section 42, a state enactment, is to be interpreted by application of Maryland common law. That includes the Maryland common law of damages, and further, the Maryland common law of punitive damages . . . . .Id.