Sheppard v. State

In Sheppard v. State, 312 Md. 118, 121-22, 538 A.2d 773 (1988), Sheppard participated in an armed robbery with three other men. Together, they fled in a single vehicle. When police disabled the car, Sheppard was apprehended as he climbed out of a rear window. His co-felons fled, however. As they tried to escape, they fired three shots at pursuing police officers. The Court of Appeals held the evidence was sufficient to convict Sheppard of assault with intent to murder the officers, even though he was already in police custody at the time those crimes occurred. "In the case at bar, the principal offense was the armed robbery of the two women at the liquor store. The aggravated assaults against the police officers, perpetrated during the escape from the commission of the robbery, were secondary or incidental offenses. Thus, contrary to Sheppard's contention that his responsibility for the aggravated assaults is dependent upon proof that he aided and abetted the commission of those offenses, Sheppard's complicity rests on the fact that he aided and abetted the armed robbery." Id. at 123. The Court was asked to determine whether the defendant was an accomplice to the crime of assault with intent to murder. Id. at 120. In that case, three men, including the defendant, robbed two store clerks and then jumped into an escape car driven by a fourth man. The car was subsequently stopped by police. The defendant was apprehended by one of the officers as he attempted to escape from the car, but the remaining men escaped into the woods. Police officers pursued the robbers and, during the chase, one of the men fired shots at the officers. Id. at 120-21. The Court determined that, on the facts of that case, the defendant was an accomplice to the shooting. Id. at 125. In so holding, the Court first explained that: As a general rule, when two or more persons participate in a criminal offense, each is responsible for the commission of the offense and for any other criminal acts done in furtherance of the commission of the offense or the escape therefrom. Id. at 121-22. The Court then explained that: An accomplice is a person who, as a result of his or her status as a party to an offense, is criminally responsible for a crime committed by another. This responsibility, known as accomplice liability, takes two forms: (1) responsibility for the planned, or principal offense (or offenses), and (2) responsibility for other criminal acts incidental to the commission of the principal offense. In order to establish complicity for the principal offense, the State must prove that the accused participated in the offense either as a principal in the second degree (aider and abettor) or as an accessory before the fact (inciter). In order to establish complicity for other crimes committed during the course of the criminal episode, the State must prove that the accused participated in the principal offense either as a principal in the first degree (perpetrator), a principal in the second degree (aider and abettor) or as an accessory before the fact (inciter) and, in addition, the State must establish that the charged offense was done in furtherance of the commission of the principal offense or the escape therefrom. Id. at 122-23.