Simmons v. State

In Simmons v. State, 313 Md. 33, 542 A.2d 1258 (1988), Simmons was accused of murder and raised the defense of imperfect self-defense. Id. at 35. At trial, Simmons sought the admission of expert testimony concerning his state of mind at the time of the offense. He proffered that he would testify that, at the time of the homicide, he believed that the use of force was necessary to prevent imminent death or serious bodily injury. The defense's expert, a psychiatrist, would then testify that her examination of Simmons revealed that he did, in fact, have such a subjective belief. Id. at 36. The trial court ruled that the expert's testimony would usurp the jury's function. Id. Simmons then made a second proffer. He claimed that the psychiatrist would testify only that the defendant's subjective belief would be consistent with his psychiatric profile. The trial court would not allow testimony as to Simmons's thought processes at the time of the homicide. Id. Ultimately, Simmons never called the psychiatrist as a witness, and was convicted of second degree murder. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court's ruling was "too broad." Id. at 41. The Court commented: "As we see it, the proffered testimony tended to prove an element of imperfect self-defense...." Id. at 39. The Court added: "In light of Hoey v. State, Simmons is permitted to present evidence of his mental state in support of his defense of imperfect self-defense." Id. at 39 n.3. Concluding that psychiatric evidence that was limited to the psychological profile of the defendant was admissible, id. at 46, the Court said: The proffered testimony has some relevance in that consistency between the specific subjective belief testified to by Simmons and Simmons's psychological profile tends to make it more likely that Simmons in fact held that subjective belief.... Here the judge did not purport to exclude the evidence by the exercise of discretion so that no issue of discretion is before us. The judge erroneously ruled, as a matter of law, that the evidence could not, under any circumstances, be admitted. As the evidence sought to be admitted may have been sufficient to convince the jury that the defendant, if guilty, was guilty of a crime less than murder, its exclusion constitutes reversible error. Accordingly, Simmons must be granted a new trial. (Simmons, 313 Md. at 48.) In Simmons v. State, the defendant was on trial for second degree murder. Asserting a defense of imperfect self-defense, Simmons sought to have an expert psychiatrist testify to his subjective belief that self-defense was necessary to avoid imminent bodily harm. The defense attorney first proffered that the expert would testify that Simmons did in fact have such a belief at the time of the killing. Second, the defense attorney proffered that the expert would testify "that Simmons's asserted subjective belief would be consistent with his psychiatric profile." 313 Md. at 36. The trial judge excluded all of the expert's testimony, ruling that the function of the jury would be "usurped" if the expert were allowed to testify. The Court affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted certiorari, and reversed, explaining: The trial judge excluded the proposed testimony on the grounds that the jury's function would be usurped if the jury were to hear the psychiatrist testify that in her opinion Simmons acted under an honest belief that self-defense was necessary when he killed the victim. In light of defense counsel's proffer that the expert would only testify that such a subjective belief would be consistent with Simmons's psychological profile we find the trial judge's ruling too broad. 313 Md. at 40-41. The Court also recognized that the criminal defendant is generally permitted to introduce any evidence relevant to the asserted defense. This will be evidence which tends to establish or disprove a material fact. Id. at 41. Simmons established two categories of psychiatric expert testimony, one which is inadmissible as a matter of law, and one which is admissible at the discretion of the trial court. The first category of testimony, under which the expert testifies that the defendant was in fact suffering from a specific psychiatric disorder on the date in question, is inadmissible as a matter of law because it usurps the jury's function and because a psychiatrist "cannot precisely reconstruct the emotions of a person at a specific time." Id. at 48. In the trial court's discretion, however, an expert may testify as to a defendant's psychiatric profile, from which the jury might infer that the defendant was suffering from the symptoms of that psychiatric disorder on the date in question. "The proffered expert testimony has some relevance in that consistency between the specific subjective belief testified to by the defendant and the defendant's psychological profile tends to make it more likely that the defendant in fact held that subjective belief." Id. The Court held that a claim of error in the granting of a motion in limine precluding the appealing party's expert witness from testifying was preserved for review without a proffer being made during trial. In Simmons, at the outset of trial, the State moved in limine to preclude the defendant from calling his proposed expert in psychiatry. After the jury was selected, and during a recess, the court heard argument on the motion. Defense counsel explained that he intended to call the psychiatrist to testify about the nature of the defendant's subjective beliefs at the time he committed the crime. The court ruled that the expert could not testify. The trial continued and defense counsel never sought to call the psychiatrist as a witness or to proffer her testimony. On appeal after conviction, the defendant contended that the court's ruling precluding the psychiatrist's testimony was in error. The State responded, inter alia, that the issue was not preserved for review. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals held that, once the court granted the motion in limine, the defendant was not required to call the expert witness to the stand or to further proffer her testimony. The Court explained that, when a judge has ruled on a motion in limine by excluding the evidence in question, and intends the ruling to "be final" and unconditional, then to require the proponent of the evidence "to make a more specific proffer or to offer the evidence again during the trial in order to preserve the issue for appellate review is unwarranted and would unduly interfere with the orderly progression of the trial." 313 Md. at 38.