In State v. Hawkins, 326 Md. 270, 279, 604 A.2d 489 (1992), the Court considered the effect of two police officers' testimony regarding the defendant's interrogation. One witness testified that the defendant gave inconsistent versions of who committed a murder and, as a result, "I went out of my office into Sergeant Bane's office and told him what had happened. He came back into the polygraph suite -- (witness slapped hand on witness table) -- I'm sorry -- came back into my office and said, told the Defendant that she was under arrest." Id. at 274. The other officer made a passing reference to the defendant's being "in the area next to the polygraph room . . . ." Id. at 275. The trial court denied a motion for a mistrial. Id. at 276. First noting that the blurts were uttered "without nefarious intent," id. at 277, the Court determined that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a new trial: The fundamental rationale in leaving the matter of prejudice vel non to the sound discretion of the trial judge is that the judge is in the best position to evaluate it. The judge is physically on the scene, able to observe matters not usually reflected in a cold record. The judge is able to ascertain the demeanor of the witnesses and to note the reaction of the jurors and counsel to inadmissible matters. That is to say, the judge has his finger on the pulse of the trial. Supporting the denial of the motion by the judge here was that the references to "polygraph" were not solicited or pursued by the prosecutor. All that the officers voiced, without embellishment, was the taboo word "polygraph". Neither officer stated that Hawkins had taken a polygraph test or had expressed her willingness or unwillingness to take it. Id. at 278. The Court held that the defendant "suffered prejudice by reason of her conviction of the count of accessory after the fact, which was inconsistent with the conviction for first-degree murder, because the guilty verdict subjected her to punishment." Id. at 290. In the trial court, defense counsel never objected to any instruction given to the jury and interposed no objection when the jury returned the verdicts, which appellant now says were inconsistent. More important, no sentence was imposed for either the depraved-heart second-degree murder or the involuntary-manslaughter conviction. Appellant was, therefore, not prejudiced.