State v. Hicks

In State v. Hicks, 285 Md. 310, 403 A.2d 356 (1979), the Court of Appeals was required to interpret Maryland Rule 746, which required that "a trial date shall be set no later then 120 days after the appearance or waiver of counsel or after the appearance of defendant before the court." 285 Md. at 312. The rule did not provide a sanction for noncompliance. Id. The Court of Appeals held in Hicks that the time requirements in Rule 746 were mandatory and required dismissal of the charges for noncompliance, in the absence of an expressed waiver by the defendant or extraordinary good cause found by the court. Id. at 317-18. In reaching this conclusion, the Court examined the purpose of the rule and concluded that it was "intended to . . . put teeth into a new statute governing the assignment of criminal cases for trial." Id. at 318. The Court overruled a prior interpretation of the rule requiring a prompt trial of criminal cases and held that dismissal was mandatory when the rule was violated. The Court also held that the decision applied to all future prosecutions and to pending cases that had reached a certain procedural stage. The Court noted that it was not required to apply it to all pending cases because the change in law did not affect the integrity of the fact-finding process, did not render a trial constitutionally impermissible, and did not render a certain type of punishment impermissible. Hicks, 285 Md. at 337. Observing that the rule in question was a prophylactic measure, and that applying the new interpretation to all pending cases would have a substantial impact on the administration of justice, the Court declined to give the new ruling "retroactive effect." Id. at 338. The Court held that a court rule stating that "a trial date shall be set" no later than 120 days after the appearance or waiver of counsel or the defendant's initial appearance, but not prescribing a sanction for non-compliance, was mandatory and required dismissal for non- compliance, absent an express waiver by the defendant or extraordinary good cause found by the court. In Hicks, the Court examined the purpose of the rule and concluded that it was "intended to . . . put teeth into a new statute governing the assignment of criminal cases for trial." 285 Md. at 318.