In Stoddard v. State, 389 Md. 681, 887 A.2d 564 (2005), Erik Stoddard, the defendant, "was convicted of second degree murder and child abuse" resulting in the death of Calen DiRubbo. Id. at 683. The evidence showed that Stoddard had been supervising DiRubbo and Jasmine Pritchett when the alleged incident occurred. Id. at 684. Jasmine's mother testified, over appellant's objection, that her daughter, after the incident, "asked her if Erik was going to get her." Id. at 685. The State offered "this utterance as evidence that the child had witnessed Stoddard commit the murder, " id. at 683, and the defendant argued that the statement was inadmissible hearsay. Id. at 685. The Court considered "whether the trial court erred in admitting testimony recounting an out-of-court utterance allegedly made by a non-testifying eighteen month old child." Id. at 683. Before deciding this issue, the Court summarized the common law view of the "implied assertion doctrine" stating "that, where a declarant's out-of-court words imply a belief in the truth of X, such words are hearsay if offered to prove that X is true." Id. at 692. It explained, "In its original Wright v. Tatham form, the doctrine did not inquire into the declarant's intent--beliefs communicated accidentally by implication are as much 'implied assertions' as beliefs expressed purposefully in an indirect manner. . . . The doctrine also did not distinguish between words and non-verbal conduct." Id. at 692-93. According to the Court, "the 1973 adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence, and the subsequent adoption by numerous states--including this State--of substantially similar rules" was "perhaps the most significant development in the American judicial treatment of implied assertions." Id. at 693. With the adoption of Federal Rule of Evidence 801(a) and its Advisory Committee Note, the drafters of the Federal Rules "expressly abolished the implied assertions doctrine with respect to non-verbal conduct not intended by the actor as a communication. As to words, the drafters were more equivocal while the Advisory Committee note to Fed. R. Evid. 801(a) states that 'nothing is an assertion unless intended to be one.'" Id. Recognizing that "the federal Advisory Committee note has been the source of disagreement in the courts and among scholars," id. at 694, the Court then addressed the application of the implied assertion doctrine in Maryland, id. at 695: In the testamentary capacity case of Waters v. Waters, 35 Md. 531 (1872), this Court considered whether certain letters were admissible to show "the manner in which the testator was treated, in regard to matters of business . . . by one well acquainted with him," in order to establish the letter-writer's opinions "in regard to the sanity of the testator, and his competency to transact business." Id. at 543. In excluding the letters, the Court adopted the rule laid down in Wright v. Tatham, which had presented substantially the same factual senario. Although "Maryland Rules 5-801(a), 5-801(c), and 5-802 are identical to the federal counterparts," Maryland has adopted "the rule laid down in Wright v. Tatham," while "many federal courts have rejected the Wright v. Tatham proposition that out-of-court words are hearsay when offered to prove facts that the declarant impliedly believed but did not intend to communicate." Id. The Stoddard Court pointed out that "the Committee note to Md. Rule 5-801 departs substantially from its federal counterpart. Rather than restricting the definition of 'assertion,' the note 'does not attempt to define "assertion," a concept best left to development in the case law.'" Id. at 696. Thus, the Court concluded, "it is clear that in adopting the Maryland Rule, this Court did not intend to adopt the federal Advisory Committee's view that 'nothing is an assertion unless intended to be one,' but rather intended to leave to case law the viability of the rule of Wright v. Tatham." Id. Turning to whether the "unintentional implications of words should remain within the definition of hearsay," the Court stated, id. at 696-97: We first look to the theory underlying the rule against hearsay in general. In contrast to the intent-based approach of the federal Advisory Committee, scholars have focused on the veracity of the declarant and have identified four factors (sometimes termed "testimonial inferences"): (1) sincerity (the danger of fabrication); (2) narration (the danger of ambiguity); (3) perception (the danger of inaccurate observation); and (4) memory (the danger of faulty recollection). Each of the four inferences is strengthened by the requirement that testimony be given in court, under oath, and subject to cross-examination. . . When, in lieu of in-court, sworn testimony, a fact is presented to the fact finder from an out-of-court declarant, the four inferences are undermined considerably. The declarant's bare words reveal little or nothing about the circumstances under which the declarant came to believe the factual proposition communicated, nor about the accuracy of the declarant's memory. They do not indicate the declarant's tone or demeanor, the circumstances surrounding the utterance, or the motives which might have influenced the declarant to speak falsely. It is cross-examination, combined with the safeguards of presence and oath, that shores up the inferences of perception, memory, narration, and sincerity. The Court rejected the rationale underlying the Federal Rule, id. at 703-04: We conclude that, with respect to the four testimonial inferences, out-of-court words offered for the truth of unintentional implications are not different substantially from out-of-court words offered for the truth of intentional communications. The declarant's lack of intent to communicate the implied proposition does not increase the reliability of the declarant's words in a degree sufficient to justify exemption from the hearsay rule. Said another way, we conclude that a declarant's lack of intent to communicate a belief in the truth of a particular proposition is irrelevant to the determination of whether the words are hearsay when offered to prove the truth of that proposition. We hold that where the probative value of words, as offered, depends on the declarant having communicated a factual proposition, the words constitute an "assertion" of that proposition. The declarant's intent vel non to communicate the proposition is irrelevant. If the words are uttered out of court, then offered in court to prove the truth of the proposition--i.e. of the "matter asserted"--they are hearsay under our rules. Returning to the case before it, the Stoddard Court treated the utterance, as an implied assertion, stating, in part, id. at 690: Contrary to the State's contention, the words are not relevant if offered merely to prove that Jasmine was afraid of Stoddard. Jasmine's fear of Stoddard is irrelevant unless it stems from a belief that she had seen Stoddard assault Calen. Although it is conceivable that Jasmine's fear, taken together with her presence during the relevant time frame, was circumstantial evidence that Jasmine witnessed Stoddard assault Calen, this conceptualization is a distinction without a difference. Jasmine's fear of Stoddard is relevant only if it is rational, i.e., only if it stems from a real-world condition or event. To rationally fear Erik Stoddard is to believe the proposition, "I have a reason to fear Erik Stoddard." Jasmine's belief in this proposition is relevant only if the "reason" at issue is her having witnessed Erik assaulting Calen. Thus, in offering Jasmine's fear as evidence, the State implicitly would be offering Jasmine's belief in the proposition "I have a reason to fear Erik Stoddard and that reason is that I saw him assault Calen." The Court concluded that Jasmine's statement should have been excluded as hearsay: Jasmine's out-of-court question, repeated in court by her mother with minimal information as to its context, is unreliable as evidence that Jasmine had witnessed Stoddard assault Calen. The question is untested as to narration/ambiguity and sincerity. Its relationship to the factual proposition it supposedly implies is untested as to ambiguity. Jasmine's belief in the implied proposition, even if genuine, is untested as to memory and perception. The dangers that arose from the State's use of this question demonstrate the continued utility of the common law approach to hearsay. Id. at 712. The Court of Appeals held that a declarant of words that imply a factual proposition need not intend for the words to imply that proposition for the words to be an "assertion," within the meaning of Rule 5-801(a). The Court rejected the intent-of-the-declarant approach to implied assertions under the hearsay rule, and instead retained the common law approach. Stoddard was convicted of second-degree murder and child abuse resulting in death. The victim was his girlfriend's three-year-old son. The child died of multiple blunt-force injuries. Stoddard was babysitting the victim and the victim's 18-month-old cousin when the victim sustained the fatal injuries. The State called as a witness the mother of the 18-month-old cousin. Over defense counsel's objection, the mother was permitted to testify that the child had asked her, in a frightened voice, "Is Stoddard going to get me?" Id. at 683. The Court of Appeals held that the child's words implied that Stoddard was the person who had killed the victim, and thus constituted an "assertion," regardless of whether the child intended to convey the factual proposition they implied. The Court explained: We conclude that . . . out-of-court words offered for the truth of unintentional implications are not different substantially from out-of-court words offered for the truth of intentional communications. The declarant's lack of intent to communicate the implied proposition does not increase the reliability of the declarant's words in a degree sufficient to justify exemption from the hearsay rule. Said another way, we conclude that a declarant's lack of intent to communicate a belief in the truth of a particular proposition is irrelevant to the determination of whether the words are hearsay when offered to prove the truth of that proposition. We hold that where the probative value of words, as offered, depends on the declarant having communicated a factual proposition, the words constitute an "assertion" of that proposition. The declarant's intent vel non to communicate the proposition is irrelevant. If the words are uttered out of court, then offered in court to prove the truth of the proposition - i.e. of the "matter asserted" - they are hearsay under our rules. (89 Md. at 703-04.)