Thornton v. State

In Thornton v. State, 162 Md. App. 719, 876 A.2d 142 (2005), Judge (now Chief Judge) Krauser wrote for the Court in affirming the decision of the trial judge not to instruct the jury on the issue of imperfect self-defense in a case in which the trial judge had ruled, inter alia, that the defendant "was the aggressor in the confrontation between the victim and himself." 162 Md. App. at 733. The Court spelled out the pertinent element with respect to which the appellant had failed to produce a prima facie case: In Maryland, the elements for perfect self-defense are: ... (3) The accused claiming the right of self-defense must not have been the aggressor or provoked the conflict; ....Id. After referring to two other elements of the defense with respect to which there is a difference between the perfect and imperfect versions, this Court made it clear that "in all other respects, the elements of the two doctrines are the same." 162 Md. App. at 734. Judge Krauser explained: "An aggressor is not entitled to a self-defense instruction if he initiated a deadly confrontation or escalated an existing confrontation to that level." Id. With respect to the failure of the defendant to generate a genuine jury issue as to his non-aggressor status, our holding, 162 Md. App. at 734-35, was clear: The circuit court ... found that appellant was the aggressor. ... In rejecting appellant's claim for imperfect self-defense, the circuit court stated, among other things, that appellant acted with "malice" because appellant "was the one that... stirred the pot and stood his ground when the challenge was accepted by the victim. We need not rehash once more the facts surrounding the stabbing. Suffice it to say that when the victim approached, it was, as the trial court noted, at appellant's invitation. ... Consequently, the circuit court did not err in rejecting appellant's imperfect self-defense claim, and thereafter convicting him of second degree murder. Having concluded that the circuit court could have reasonably found that appellant was an aggressor in the fight ... we need not address appellant's other contentions concerning imperfect self-defense.