In Turrisi v. Sanzaro, 308 Md. 515, 520 A.2d 1080 (1987), the Court of Appeals considered whether the Alimony Act of 1980 (the "Act") abrogated the chancellor's power to reserve judgment as to an award of alimony. In that case, the parties were both medical doctors, and each was self-supporting. The wife had been diagnosed with multiple sclerosis, however, and was forced to abandon surgery and hospital work in favor of part-time work in a medical office. The evidence also showed that multiple sclerosis is a chronic, progressive disease that would probably render the wife totally disabled in less than five years. While the wife was self-supporting at the time of the hearing, she sought the right to seek alimony in the future, in the event that she became unable to support herself due to her poor health. Nevertheless, the chancellor determined that the wife had declined an immediate award of alimony, and that he did not have the power to reserve with respect to future alimony. The Court of Appeals disagreed and reversed. The Court held that the Act did not "abolish the inherent power of an equity court to reserve jurisdiction as to alimony when it awards a divorce." Id. at 528. Rather, the Court concluded that the chancellor retains discretion under the Act to reserve as to alimony. Id. The Court explained: The concepts of rehabilitative alimony for a definite time, the desirability of each spouse becoming self-supporting, the undesirability of alimony as a lifetime pension, and the use of indefinite alimony only in exceptional circumstances do not mandate the elimination of the power to reserve. For example, facts before a court may demonstrate no present basis for either rehabilitative or indefinite alimony. But those same facts may show that a highly probable basis for awarding one or the other will exist in the immediate future. Under such circumstances, we see no reason why reservation would be inconsistent with the purposes of the Act. Indeed, under such circumstances, reservation would be consistent with the Act's overall purpose . . . to provide for an appropriate degree of spousal support in the form of alimony after the dissolution of the marriage. (Turrisi, 308 Md. at 527.) In reaching its decision, the Court reviewed the historical treatment of alimony by Maryland equity courts, noting the "long-standing rule" that "the right to claim alimony ordinarily could not survive the dissolution of the marriage." Id. at 521. Consequently, the Court observed that it became "common practice for the equity courts to reserve jurisdiction over alimony, even though none was awarded at the time of divorce." Turrisi, 308 Md. at 522. The reservation enabled the court to award alimony "long after the grant of an absolute divorce. " Id. The Court recognized that the Act, now codified in Title 11 of the Family Law Article, had a profound effect on "the alimony landscape." Id. at 525. Yet, as the Court observed, the Act was silent as to reservation. Id. at 527. Concluding that the many changes generated by the Act did not alter the equity court's inherent power to reserve, id. at 525-26, the Court reasoned: "To ask us to assume that by mere silence the legislature intended to abolish a long-standing inherent power of Maryland equity courts, specifically called to its attention by the Governor's 1980 Commission on Domestic Relations Law, is to ask too much." Id. at 527. Noting that the "repeal of such a power by silence is not favored," the Court declined to "indulge any such assumption. . . ." Id. at 527. Nor did it believe that the purpose of the Act mandated the abolishment of the power to reserve. Id. Notwithstanding the continued power of an equity court to reserve, the Court made clear that a reservation requires the proper exercise of discretion. Moreover, the Court specified a number of circumstances in which a reservation "is no longer proper." Id. at 529. For example, the Court declared that a reservation would not be appropriate based on a "vague future expectation. . . ." Id. Elaborating on the types of circumstances that would or would not justify a reservation, the Court said: To hold that the power to reserve alimony still exists is not to say that it may be appropriately exercised in every case. The power is a discretionary one, and whether a chancellor should exercise his discretion in favor of reservation is a matter affected by various considerations, non-statutory as well as statutory.... Furthermore, in view of the Act's emphasis on promotion of economic self-sufficiency, its favorable approach to alimony for a definite period, and its opposition to the notion of alimony as a lifetime pension, it would not be appropriate to reserve simply because there may be some vague future expectation of circumstances that might show a basis for alimony. By the same token, the possibility that a claimant might become aged, infirm, or disabled, or that standards of living could conceivably be unconscionably disparate at some unknown future date, thus potentially invoking 11-106(c), would not provide a basis for reservation. Reservation like that approved in Buehler, 229 Md. at 319, 182 A.2d at 878, where a wife obtained reservation merely on an allegation that her future ability to support herself was "'of necessity uncertain,'" is no longer proper. On the other hand, there may be cases which do not involve monetary awards, family homes, or reasonable and necessary expenses, and in which grounds for divorce unquestionably exist. The case before us is one. If, in a case of this sort, the record contains evidence from which the chancellor could find that the claimant, in the reasonably foreseeable future, will be in circumstances that would justify an award of rehabilitative or indefinite alimony, it would not be an abuse of discretion to reserve. (Turrisi, 308 Md. at 528-530). Thus, Turrisi announced that the power to reserve with respect to an award of alimony remains a viable option in the discretion of the chancellor, but the particular circumstances must warrant the reservation. Turrisi illustrates the principle that, "even with respect to a discretionary matter, a trial court must exercise its discretion in accordance with correct legal standards." In Turrisi v. Sanzaro, the parties had been able to resolve the bulk of the issues in their divorce by agreement. Both parties were medical doctors, but during the marriage, Dr. Sanzaro was diagnosed with multiple sclerosis. She wished to remain self-supporting, and the chancellor found that she declined alimony at the time of the divorce. "On the authority of Quigley v. Quigley, 54 Md. App. 45, 456 A.2d 1305 (1983), the chancellor held he had no power to reserve the question of future alimony." Turrisi, 308 Md. at 519. The Court agreed with the chancellor, although we remanded the case for further inquiry into other factors that might be relevant to an alimony award. The Court of Appeals, in reversing that decision, traced the history of Maryland equity courts' treatment of alimony. It was "common practice for the equity courts to reserve jurisdiction over alimony, even though none was awarded at the time of the divorce." Turrisi, 308 Md. at 522. The Alimony Act was eventually passed and is now codified at Title 11 of the Family Law Article. The Court then looked to the Act to determine whether it abrogated the equity courts' "inherent power to award alimony, and inherent power to reserve as to alimony." As part of its review, the Court of Appeals also looked at the 1980 Report of the Governor's Commission on Domestic Relations Law ("1980 Report"), in which the Alimony Act was proposed. Turrisi, 308 Md. at 526. The Commission recognized the existence of the inherent power of the equity courts to reserve on the issue of alimony, and it observed "'when a Court enters a decree of divorce; it may also award alimony or reserve the right to do so.'" Turrisi, 308 Md. at 527. The Court of Appeals addressed the question of whether the equity court's inherent power to reserve deciding the issue of alimony was eliminated by the Act. In that case, the wife at first sought indefinite alimony but at trial withdrew her request for an immediate award. The evidence showed that she was presently self-supporting as a physician. It also showed that she had multiple sclerosis, a progressive disease, and that, more likely than not, she would be totally disabled and therefore not self-supporting in five years. The wife asked the court to grant a divorce and reserve jurisdiction to decide the issue of indefinite alimony at a later date. The court granted a divorce, found that the wife had waived her request for immediate alimony, and declined to reserve on the issue of alimony, concluding that the Act had removed its power to do so. The Court of Appeals reversed on the issue of reservation. It held that the Act did not eliminate the equity court's inherent power to reserve jurisdiction to decide the issue of alimony at a later date, after the divorce. Id. at 528. It explained, however, that the policy of self-sufficiency underlying the Act now limits the circumstances in which an equity court properly may exercise its discretion to reserve. Reserving jurisdiction over the issue of alimony is not an abuse of discretion when the facts at trial "show that a highly probable basis for awarding either rehabilitative or indefinite alimony will exist in the immediate future." Id. at 530. In that situation, reservation does not run afoul of "the concepts of rehabilitative alimony for a definite time, the desirability of each spouse becoming self-supporting, the undesirability of alimony as a lifetime pension, and the use of indefinite alimony only in exceptional circumstances." Id. at 528. The Court further explained that, in view of "the Act's emphasis on promotion of economic self-sufficiency, its favorable approach to alimony for a definite period, and its opposition to the notion of alimony as a lifetime pension," it is improper for a court to reserve deciding the issue of alimony "simply because there may be some vague future expectation of circumstances that might show a basis for alimony," or "the possibility that the alimony claimant might become aged, infirm, or disabled, or that standards of living could conceivably be unconscionably disparate at some unknown future date. . . ." Id. at 529. The Court in Turrisi concluded that, because there was evidence adduced in the divorce trial showing a probability that in the near future the wife's illness would render her incapable of being self-supporting -- an exceptional circumstance that would support an award of indefinite alimony under FL section 11-106(c)(1) -- the court properly could have exercised discretion to reserve deciding the issue of alimony. See by contrast Durkee v. Durkee, 144 Md. App. 161, 797 A.2d 94 (2002) (holding that the circuit court abused its discretion in reserving a decision on alimony on the basis of evidence that the husband's business might in the future produce income commensurate with his earnings potential, and therefore it was possible that there would be an unconscionable disparity in standards of living of the former spouses).