In Warr v. JMGM Group, LLC, 433 Md. 170, 70 A.3d 347 (2013), the Court of Appeals "declined to impose dram shop liability on Dogfish Head Alehouse in the absence of any duty owed to the Warrs," the survivors of the driver the Alehouse's customer hit and killed on his way home. Id. at 177. The Court held--reiterated, really--that "a tavern owner who provides alcohol to an intoxicated patron does not exercise control over the conduct of the patron, in driving or walking, for example," and that "regardless of any foreseeability, a duty does not exist to the general public, with respect to harm caused by a third party, absent the existence of a special relationship between the person sued and the injured party or the person sued and the third party." Id. at 183-84. The Court noted that a criminal statute will create a tort duty only if it is enacted for the protection of a particular class of persons. In that case, the Court held that Art. 2B 12-108(a)(1), preventing the sale of alcohol to visibly intoxicated persons, did not satisfy this requirement because the statute was enacted for the protection of "the people of this State," a general class of individuals. The Court of Appeals revisited the issue whether a tavern owner could be held liable for the actions of an intoxicated patron. In a four to three opinion, the majority of the Court declined to recognize a cause of action against a commercial vendor who sells alcohol to another person. 433 Md. at 199. The analysis in the majority opinion, however, focused on the duty element of a cause of action for negligence, as opposed to the element of proximate cause. In Warr, a patron of Dogfish Head Alehouse (the "tavern") consumed at least 17 drinks and then drove away and struck Mr. Warr's vehicle, resulting in injuries to Mr. Warr and one of his daughters and the death of his second daughter. Id. at 173-74. Mr. and Mrs. Warr sued the tavern, alleging that it "had breached its duty to 'not furnish alcohol to intoxicated persons,' which caused their injuries." Id. at 174. The Court declined to impose dram shop liability on the tavern "in the absence of any duty owed by the tavern to the Warrs." Id. at 177. The Court began by noting the general rule that "'there is no duty to control a third person's conduct so as to prevent personal harm to another, unless a special relationship exists either between the actor and the third person or between the actor and the person injured.'" Id. at 183 (quoting Remsburg v. Montgomery, 376 Md. 568, 583, 831 A.2d 18 (2003)). It adhered to the principle that "human beings, drunk or sober, are responsible for their own torts," id. at 190, and it held that a tavern owner does not have a duty of care to members of the general public for harm caused by a patron, absent a "special relationship." Id. at 183-195. Because the Warrs did not "allege a special relationship between themselves and the owners" of the tavern, the tavern "did not owe a duty to the Warrs, as members of the general public." Id. at 195, 199. The Court of Appeals then discussed the Warrs' argument that, "because there is a criminal statute prohibiting the sale of alcohol to visibly intoxicated persons," "the tavern owners owed a duty to refuse to serve an intoxicated patron." Id. at 195. In rejecting that argument, the Court stated that, historically, it had "not extrapolated civil liability from criminal statutes regulating the sale of alcohol," noting that, in Felder v. Butler, 292 Md. 174, 183-84, 438 A.2d 494 (1981), the Court had rejected the argument that the existence of this criminal statute was sufficient to establish civil liability because the legislature "had not enacted laws to impose civil liability." Id. at 197-98. The Court explained that, to impose civil liability on the basis of a criminal statute, a party must show "'(a) the violation of a statute or ordinance designed to protect a specific class of persons which includes the plaintiff, and (b) that the violation proximately caused the injury complained of.'" Id. at 198. The Court stated that the criminal statute relied on by the Warrs was not designed to protect a specific class if persons. It explained: The statutes regulating the sale of alcohol and prohibiting its provision to those visibly intoxicated were enacted "for the protection, health, welfare and safety of the people of this State." Maryland Code (1957, 2011 Repl.Vol.), Article 2B, Section 1-101(a)(3). Our jurisprudence establishes that this general class of individuals is not sufficient to create a tort duty because, "we have always required the statute or ordinance allegedly violated to set forth mandatory acts that are clearly for the protection of a particular class of persons and not merely for the public as a whole." . . . Thus, the existence of criminal statutes prohibiting the sale of alcohol to intoxicated individuals is not sufficient to support liability in the instant case, because the statute does not identify a particular class of protectees. Id. at 198-99. Accordingly, the Court held that the tavern "did not owe a duty to the Warrs, as members of the general public." Id. at 199. The Court further stated that it agreed with the words of the Supreme Court of Delaware that "the determination of whether to impose liability on tavern owners for injuries caused by intoxicated patrons involves significant public policy considerations and is best left to the General Assembly." Id. at 199.