In Wartzman v. Hightower Prod., Ltd., 53 Md. App. 656, 668, 456 A.2d 82 (1983), after a jury trial, the appellee filed a cross-appeal alleging that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to permit the jury to consider prejudgment interest on the jury's award of reliance damages. In that case, "Hightower filed suit alleging breach of contract and negligence for Wartzman's failure to have created a corporation authorized to raise the capital necessary to fund a venture. At the trial, Hightower introduced into evidence its obligations and expenditures incurred in reliance on the defendant law firm's creation of a corporation." Id. at 660. The trial court instructed the jury that in order to find liability, the plaintiff must prove three things: First, the employment of the defendants in behalf of the Plaintiff and the extent of the duties for which the Defendants were employed; secondly, that the Defendants neglected the duties undertaken in the employment and, thirdly, that such negligence resulted in and was the proximate cause of loss by the Plaintiff, that is that the Plaintiff was deprived of any right or parted with anything of value in reliance upon the negligence of the Defendants. Id. at 666. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Hightower in the amount of $170,508.43, and on appeal, Hightower argued that the trial court erred in failing to present the issue of prejudgment interest to the jury. Id. at 661, 668. Finding no error, the Court stated: Applicable Maryland law provides that where a claim is for unliquidated damages, interest may run from the date of the judgment, but not before. Affiliated Distillers v. R.W.L. Wine & Liquor Co., 213 Md. 509, 132 A.2d 582, (1957), Taylor v. Wahby, 271 Md. 101, 314 A.2d 100, (1974). The reliance damages sought in this case are not subject to pre-judgment valuation. "Reasonable and justified" damages incurred by reason of Mr. Wartzman's representation of Hightower were not reasonably ascertainable until the jury rendered its verdict. Refusal to permit the jury to consider prejudgment interest, therefore, was not an abuse of discretion. Id. at 668-69.