In Watters v. State, 328 Md. 38, 612 A.2d 1288 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1024 (1993), a deputy sheriff excluded people from the courtroom "without the knowledge or consent of the trial judge or the parties." Id. at 42. The sheriff "excluded the public, including members of defendant's family and possibly representatives of the press, from the courtroom during voir dire and jury selection -- a process that consumed the entire first morning of trial." Id. The deputy sheriff testified that he closed the courtroom because of "'the number of people involved in the case and the courtroom would not handle all the persons who wanted to get into the courtroom.'" Id. The Court of Appeals held that, because the courtroom was not full, and there were "'some seats' available," the circumstances "did not present a compelling need for excluding members of the defendant's family as well as the press and the public." Id. at 42, 45. Moreover, it held that, "even if the State could show that under the circumstances then prevailing the government had a legitimate interest in preventing overcrowding, it could not show that the exclusion of all persons was a narrowly tailored means of protecting that interest," noting that "empty seats were left vacant." Id. at 45. In Watters, 328 Md. at 46, the Court expressed agreement with the proposition that "not every closure is of constitutional dimension." Id. Although noting that "the deprivation of the constitutional right to a public trial cannot be harmless error," Id. at 48, the Court agreed that a violation could be "classified as de minimus and undeserving of constitutional protection." Id. at 46. The Court, however, rejected the State's argument in that case that the closure was "de minimus." Id. at 49. It explained: "The scope of the closure in this case was substantial. The courtroom was open only to court personnel, the venirepersons, and witnesses. All other members of the public, including members of the defendant's family and the press, were barred. The closure extended over a significant period of time -- an entire morning of trial during which the voir dire and selection and swearing of the jury were accomplished. Although we agree with the State that not every technical violation of the Sixth Amendment right of open trial requires a new proceeding or trial, we would be hard pressed to declare a violation of this magnitude de minimus, or otherwise not of constitutional significance. We conclude that this violation of the defendant's Sixth Amendment right carries with it the presumption of specific prejudice mandated by Waller, and thus requires the granting of appropriate relief. Under the particular facts of this case, that relief is necessarily the granting of a new trial." Id.