In Williams v. State, 364 Md. 160, 771 A.2d 1082 (2001), the defendant was charged with distribution of cocaine. Id. at 165. "The State's case relied heavily on the testimony of an accomplice" and Trooper Wilson. Id. The accomplice, as part of a plea arrangement, stated that the defendant entered the apartment prior to the police raid and engaged in a drug transaction. Id. Trooper Wilson "was the only other State's witness to place defendant at the apartment on the night of the raid." Id. at 166. Although it was unclear if the State purposefully or accidentally misled the defendant, the State informed the defendant through discovery that it did not have any pre-trial identification evidence at that time. Id. On numerous occasions prior to trial, the State told the court and defense counsel that the police officer could only offer a general description of the man he observed at the raid. Id. at 166-67. Counsel filed a motion to suppress the identification and the court, based on the State's claim that the officer could only identify appellant's "size, height, and stature," denied the motion prior to trial and found that no pre-trial identification existed. Id. Although the State had repeatedly proffered that the police officer could not give more than a general description of the appellant at trial, Trooper Wilson "distinctly stated, 'it was Mr. Williams who is seated at the defense table.'" Id. at 167-68. Counsel objected to the identification and moved for a new trial arguing, inter alia, that Rule 4-263 was violated because the State failed to disclose the Trooper's pre-trial identification. Id. at 168. The Court denied counsel's request for a new trial and found that, even though the officer's testimony was a surprise out-of-court identification, it was a surprise to the State also, and the State could not inform defense counsel of something it did not know. The Court of Appeals in Williams, in framing the issue before it, articulated the rationale undergirding the mandatory provisions of the Rule: The issue before us today -- whether police surveillance observations are subject to the mandatory disclosure requirements of Rule 4-263(a)(2)(C)--is a novel question of law, requiring this Court, for the first time, to discuss the scope of the pretrial identification provision. We have often stated that the scope of pretrial disclosure requirements under Maryland Rule 4-263 must be defined in light of the underlying policies of the rule. See Johnson v. State, 360 Md. at 265, 757 A.2d at 804 (2000); State v. Brown, 327 Md. 81, 90, 607 A.2d 923, 927 (1992). Inherent benefits of discovery include providing adequate information to both parties to facilitate informed pleas, ensuring thorough and effective cross-examination, and expediting the trial process by diminishing the need for continuances to deal with unfamiliar information presented at trial. Specific to the mandatory disclosure provisions of Rule 4-263(a), the major objectives are to assist defendants in preparing their defense and to protect them from unfair surprise. See Patrick v. State, 329 Md. 24, 30, 617 A.2d 215, 218 (1992). The duty to disclose pre-trial identifications, then, is properly determined by interpreting the plain meaning of the Rule with proper deference to these policies. (Id. at 172.) The Court dismissed the State's contention that the Rule is limited to traditional pre-trial identifications such as show-ups or line-ups. Id. at 173. The Court explained that discovery rules should assist the defendant in preparing a defense and protect him from surprise...Identification testimony may be outcome determinative and hence, any solid preparation of a defense demands this information. Furthermore, unlike statements made by the defendant, identification testimony naturally comes from third parties. As such, it is information with which, absent the State's disclosure, a defendant may never be familiar until trial. To prevent unfair surprise, disclosure of identification testimony is required. Id. at 174 . "We cannot allow the State to be the recipient of the unquestionable windfall that resulted from its own clear violation of the discovery rules." Id. at 176. The Court concluded that Maryland Rule 4-263(g) mandates that the State's Attorney turn over any information obtained from Trooper Wilson, and the "State is charged with the 'knowledge of all seemingly pertinent facts related to the charge which are known to the police department'." Id. at 176 (quoting Robinson v. State, 354 Md. 287, 304, 730 A.2d 181 (1999)). The Court held that Trooper Wilson's observations, "if used by the State for purposes of identification, is 'relevant material regarding a pretrial identification' under Rule 4-263(a)(2)(C) and disclosure is required." Id. at 178. Thus, the Court's reasoning was based on potential disruption of the trial process by unfair surprise, the right of counsel to prepare, including evaluation of the State's case in deciding how to plead and obviating the need for continuances. The Court held that the "State's failure to provide defendant with complete and accurate information regarding the extent to which Trooper Wilson, the only corroborating witness identification of the defendant, could identify Williams is prejudicial and cannot be construed as harmless error." 364 Md. at 179. The Court further stated: The inaccurate representation by the State in this case pertained to a fact pivotal to defendant's defense. Whether a witness can positively identify the accused at the scene of the crime is often the cardinal facet of a determination of guilt. The State's violation is particularly egregious because the only other testimony linking defendant to the charge for which he was being prosecuted came from an accomplice who testified pursuant to a plea agreement with the State. . .Therefore, without a positive identification by Trooper Wilson, defendant could have had a strong basis for moving for judgment of acquittal after the State rested its case. The trial judge's verdict clearly reveals the great weight that was placed on Trooper Wilson's identification testimony in determining defendant's guilt. Id. at 179-80. The Court concluded that Trooper Wilson's testimony was unquestionably relied upon by the trial judge and, because his pre-trial identification "was the only corroborating testimony against defendant," the error of admitting the evidence was not harmless, as it contributed "to the rendition of a guilty verdict." Id. at 180-81. The Court of Appeals applied the "harmless error" standard of appellate review in holding that a discovery violation resulting in the admission of harmful identification testimony required a mistrial. See 364 Md. at 180-81. In doing so, the Court emphasized the policy reasons for mandatory disclosure in criminal cases. The discovery rules "are not mere guides but are 'precise rubrics' to be strictly followed." 364 Md. at 171. The "major objectives" of mandatory disclosure are "to assist defendants in preparing their defense and to protect them from unfair surprise" at trial. 364 Md. at 172. Specifically, the mandatory disclosure rule "facilitates . . . effective cross- examination" and allows the defense to determine "whether certain motions can be filed prior to trial" in order to "protect the defendant from surprise" at trial. 364 Md. at 172, 174. Using the most stringent standard of appellate review to examine the prejudicial effect of a discovery violation promotes these objectives and prevents the State from being "the recipient of the unquestionable windfall that resulted from its own clear violation of the discovery rules." 364 Md. at 176. In sum, in Williams v. State, a jailhouse snitch testified at trial that Williams had confessed to the murder for which he was later convicted. The State had informed the defense that the informant had received nothing in return for the information, and the informant so testified at trial. Later, it was determined that the informant was a paid informant of the Baltimore City Police. His status as a paid informant was known to other members of the State's Attorney's office and police detectives not involved with Williams's case. On appeal, the Court concluded that the State's failure to disclose the informant's status as a paid informant constituted a Brady violation. The Court of Appeals affirmed our decision in Williams, holding that "the disclosure obligation imposed by Brady does, in fact, apply to information possessed by other prosecutors in the same office." In addressing Maryland Rule 4-263(g), the Court observed: "It is clear from the language used by the rule that the obligations of the State's Attorney to disclose encompasses three groups: 1 the State's Attorney, 2 his or her staff members, and 3 those who are not either of the foregoing, but who have participated, or are participating, in the case itself, by, for example, participating "in the investigation or evaluation of the action," regularly reporting to the State's Attorney's Office, or, with respect to the case under review, have reported to the State's Attorney's Office." The Court concluded that the prosecutor is responsible for disclosing discoverable material in the possession of other members of the State's Attorney's Office, but not necessarily information in the possession of those outside the State's Attorney's Office: "We hold that by referring only to the "State's Attorney and staff members," without any restriction, and then including "any others," restricted to those with a direct present or past involvement with the particular action, Rule 4-263(g) draws a distinction between the State's Attorney's Office and those outside the Office who are on the prosecution team." Williams v. State, 364 Md. 160, 771 A.2d 1082 (2001), involved the requirement of Maryland Rule 4-263(a)(2)(C) that the State disclose information relating to a "pretrial identification of the defendant by a witness for the State." The State had proffered that a police officer could describe the physical features of a person he saw at the crime scene, but could not identify Williams. The trial court allowed the officer's testimony. At trial, however, the officer identified Williams as the person at the scene. The Court of Appeals held that the Rule applies to a pretrial identification by a police officer, and therefore the State was required to disclose the officer's identification of Williams. The Court further determined that the State's ignorance of the officer's identification of Williams did not relieve it of its disclosure obligation: We cannot allow the State to be the recipient of the unquestionable windfall that resulted from its own clear violation of the discovery rules. Contrary to the conclusions of the trial judge, "surprise" does not excuse or mitigate the prejudice to the defendant. . . . Maryland Rule 4-263(g) clearly articulates that the State's Attorney was accountable for information held by the officer, as he both "participated in the investigation" and "reported to the office of the State's Attorney." . . . Therefore, whether the inaccurate representation was a result of willful aforethought or inadvertence is irrelevant because the determination of a discovery violation does not mandate inquiry into a party's mental state. Nor is the effect of the inaccurate representation neutralized simply because the State's Attorney may have lacked foreknowledge of the ultimate testimony. . . . If the State's Attorney's lack of knowledge could excuse, or even mitigate the prejudicial effect of the undisclosed information, States' Attorneys would most effectively operate in a vacuum because, by removing themselves from the privity of police testimony and evidence, States' Attorneys could slip beyond the grasp of discovery rules by claiming ignorance, and thereby force the defendant to enter trial unaware of the evidence to be offered against him. This is intolerable and totally adverse to one of the avowed purposes for the discovery rules: to assist the defendant in preparing his defense and prevent unfair surprise at trial. (Williams, 364 Md. at 176-78.) In Williams, the Court of Appeals determined that the officer's identification of Williams fell within the State's discovery obligations because the officer had "both 'participated in the investigation' and 'reported to the office of the State's Attorney.'" Id. at 177 (quoting Md. Rule 4-263(g)). The Court of Appeals had occasion to construe Rule 4-263 in the context of a surprise in-court identification of the defendant by a State's witness. The defendant was convicted of distribution of cocaine. That charge and others were brought against him in connection with a raid of an apartment by narcotics officers, pursuant to a search warrant. Trooper Wilson was one of the officers surveilling the apartment in the hours leading up to and immediately prior to the raid. A large quantity of cocaine was seized from the apartment when the warrant was executed; three men found in the apartment were arrested and charged with narcotics violations. The defendant, who was not found in the apartment, was charged upon allegations that he had entered the apartment 30 minutes before the search warrant was executed and had delivered cocaine to the three residents; and that he had left the apartment before the raid occurred. Prior to trial, defense counsel made numerous discovery requests that asked, in one form or another, whether Trooper Wilson could identify the defendant as the man seen entering the premises where the drugs were seized. Again and again, the State responded that Trooper Wilson could not. Defense counsel also filed a motion to suppress extrajudicial identifications and, in an attached cover letter, offered to withdraw the motion as moot upon confirmation that Trooper Wilson could not identify the defendant. Before the hearing on the motion to suppress, the prosecutor verbally confirmed that no identification had occurred, stating that Trooper Wilson could only give a "general description of a man who entered the surveilled premises." Id. at 166. Defense counsel agreed that such a general description is not a "pretrial identification" under Rule 4-263. The State also proffered to the court that Trooper Wilson would testify as to "the stature, the size, the height and definitely that it was an African American individual. . ." Id. at 167. At the defendant's bench trial, Trooper Wilson testified that the man he saw entering the apartment 30 minutes before the raid was "Mr. Williams who is seated at the defense table." Id. at 168. On cross-examination, the trooper testified that he had told the prosecutor, four months before trial, that he recognized the defendant as that man. Defense counsel moved to strike Trooper Wilson's in-court identification, renewed a motion to dismiss, and moved the court for an immediate evidentiary hearing. The court denied the motions, stating: The . . . out of court identification of . . . Trooper Wilson was a surprise to the State's Attorney and you feel that . . . under Rule 4-263 he should have informed you. And I agree with you on that. But, if it was a surprise to him, he couldn't inform you of something he didn't know about. It was a surprise to you and to him. And I don't think that he deliberately withheld it back. I asked him point blank again was it a surprise, and he indicated it was. So I don't think that all of this taken together warrants a new trial. Id. Aside from Trooper Wilson's testimony, the State's case consisted of accomplice testimony, from one of the residents arrested in the raid, that the defendant had delivered cocaine to the premises for distribution. On appeal after conviction, the defendant argued that the State had violated its discovery obligations under Rule 4-263 and that he had been prejudiced as a result. The Court affirmed the conviction in an unreported opinion. The Court of Appeals granted certiorari and reversed. The Court noted that discovery rules must be interpreted "in light of their underlying policies." Id. at 172. It observed that the "major objectives" of Rule 4-263(a) are "to assist defendants in preparing their defense and to protect them from unfair surprise." Id. In light of these underlying policies, the Court considered the impact of a surprise in-court identification upon a defendant, stating: "One can hardly imagine a greater obstacle to an accused's defense than the State's declaration prior to trial that the only corroborating witness could not specifically identify the defendant, while the testimony of the witness at trial was nothing shy of a clear and positive identification. . . . Identification testimony may be outcome determinative and hence, any solid preparation of a defense demands this information. Furthermore, unlike statements made by the defendant . . . identification testimony naturally comes from third parties. As such, it is information with which, absent the State's disclosure, a defendant may never be familiar until trial. To prevent unfair surprise, disclosure of identification testimony is required." Id. at 174. The Court rejected the State's argument that, because it had told defense counsel that Trooper Wilson could generally describe the defendant, there was no discovery violation. It noted: Disclosure, in and of itself, would be immaterial if it is not accompanied by the necessary and intrinsic quality of accuracy. Substantial inaccuracy with respect to whether a State's witness can identify the accused is particularly disconcerting because, depending on the precision of the identification, the outcome of the trial may often be affected . . . .Id. at 175. The Court accepted the trial court's factual finding that the non-disclosure was "inadvertent" but emphasized that malfeasance by the State is not necessary for it to have committed a discovery violation: "'Surprise' does not excuse or mitigate the prejudice to the defendant." Id. at 176.