Willow Tree Learning Center, Inc. v. Prince George's County

In Willow Tree Learning Center, Inc. v. Prince George's County, 85 Md. App. 508, 584 A.2d 157 (1991), a child was injured on a frayed rope that was part of playground equipment at a private day-care center. The parents of the child argued "that the frayed rope was a violation of applicable safety regulations, and that under Md. Regs. Code title 10, .05.01.16 ("COMAR") and the Prince George's County Code, a duty was created on the part of the County to discover and report it." Id. at 513-14. The Court held that "the State nor the County . . . owes any individual duty of care merely by the enactment of a general ordinance requiring safety inspections, nor by the fact that it undertook inspections for safety violations. The duty created by the statute and ordinance was one owed to the public generally." Id. at 515. The Court held that a child fatally injured on his day care center's playground equipment did not have a claim against municipal defendants who were responsible for regulating and inspecting that equipment. The Court explained that a government's offer of safety-related services does not, in itself, create a special duty of care. "We do not believe that a special relationship, creating a tortious duty, is created by a governmental decision to legislate safety programs in a particular industry, unless that duty is expressly created by the statute." Id. at 519. The Court held that neither the State nor a county "owes any individual duty of care merely by the enactment of a general ordinance requiring safety inspections, nor by the fact that it undertook inspections for safety violations." Id. at 515. In that case, five-year-old Brian Sanders was fatally injured while using playground equipment on the premises of the Willow Tree Learning Center ("Willow Tree"), a private daycare center. Brian's parents filed a negligence action against Willow Tree which, in turn, sought contribution and/or indemnification from Evelyn Hoban, a county employee who had inspected the play equipment, and Prince George's County, Hoban's employer. The Sanders settled with Willow Tree. Hoban and Prince George's County filed motions to dismiss, or in the alternative, for summary judgment, which the trial court granted on the grounds that Hoban's inspection of Willow Tree was a governmental function arising out of the exercise of the Prince George's County's police powers; that the inspection did not create a legal duty to the owner, operator, or user of the inspected premises; and there were no statutory provisions creating such a duty. Id. at 511. In affirming the circuit court's grant of summary judgment, we rejected the argument that applicable safety regulations contained in the Maryland Code, COMAR, and the Prince George's County Code, created a duty on the part of Hoban and the County to the Sanders. The Court held that "the duty created by the statute and ordinance was one owed to the public generally." Willow Tree, 85 Md. App. at 515. The Court also noted that there was "a complete lack of any intention on the part of the Legislature which would indicate that it was creating a duty to individual members of the public," and we declined to create one ourselves. Id. at 516. In addition, the Court rejected the Sanders' assertion that a special relationship was created between them and the County (1) by the County's action in licensing, regulating, and inspecting the day care center to ensure the safety of children using the playground, (2) by the enactment of the statute mandating inspections, and (3) by the County's adoption of an inspection program through which it voluntarily assumed a special relationship with the children attending the daycare center. The Court rejected these arguments, holding: We do not believe that a special relationship, creating a tortious duty, is created by a governmental decision to legislate safety programs in a particular industry, unless that duty is expressly created by the statute. This is in accord with the majority of the cases we have reviewed from other jurisdictions. As far as we can discern, there are no Maryland cases to the contrary. We hold that no special relationship existed between Willow Tree and the County. In sum, virtually every citizen or visitor to this State has contact on a daily basis with an entity that is subject to governmental health and safety inspections. To hold that the inspection in the case sub judice creates special relationships and duties giving rise to the right to sue the County might well extend far beyond the specific ramifications of the case at bar. We perceive a clarity of legislative purpose from the profusion of regulation and inspection provisions that the legislature has created. That purpose, as often stated in the statutory provisions themselves, is to insure the health and safety of the people of Maryland. A proliferation of suits and judgments resulting therefrom against the State and/or local governments based upon duties or special relationships, perceived by the litigants to have been created to run to them personally, as opposed to the public generally, might well cause the legislative branch to pause and reconsider the feasibility of continuing this type of regulatory activity. Any cessation or suspension of the Legislature's willingness to protect its citizens, we believe, would be disproportionately injurious to the public in general. The creation of causes of action arising out of statutory schemes of regulations and inspections is a matter of policy and should be addressed, if at all, by the Legislature. It is not the function of the judiciary to make policy of this type. Absent an explicit statement in a statute creating that type of duty, we do not believe that courts should draft them into a statute by implication. We hold, specifically in reference to the present statute, that no such duty nor special relationship expressly or impliedly exists. There being no duty, there can be no breach of duty and thus no actionable negligence. (Id. at 519-22.)