In Wilson v. State, 148 Md. App. 601, 814 A.2d 1 (2002), cert. denied, 374 Md. 82, 821 A.2d 370 (2003), there was an eighteen-month delay between the date of Ismall Wilson's arrest and the commencement of his murder trial. Seven months of that delay (between the arrest on December 7, 1999, and the first trial date on July 6, 2000) were deemed to be neutral. Wilson, 148 Md. App. at 628. And Wilson, timely invoked his right to a speedy trial. Id. at 637. As against Wilson, twelve months of the delay were chargeable against the State, the last four months of which were heavily charged against the State for failure to provide discovery. Id. at 640. In Wilson, no demonstrable prejudice was shown, and therefore, we held that dismissal of the case was not warranted. Id. at 651. Nevertheless, the Court said in Wilson: "In our view, the lack of diligence in providing counsel for Wilson and McCoy discoverable materials, including the six- month delay in submitting evidence for DNA testing, would warrant a dismissal of the charges against them were they able to establish demonstrable prejudice." Id. at 640. The Court considered whether the prosecution's closing remarks concerning the defense's non-production of witnesses and evidence were improper and merited a mistrial. There, the prosecutor stated: Now, you heard from the judge's instructions that the defendants are claiming that Alvin Thomas was involved in this somehow, that he was part and parcel of it, that he got together with defendants and said, "Hey, let's go over to the house and rob my relatives and kick the door in." That's what they're saying. Did you hear that from any of these witnesses? No. Did you hear that in any of the statements that were made by defendants to any of these witnesses? No. Do you see that reflected in any of the writings that came into evidence from Fish McCoy? No. Why not? Because we're at trial and defendants have to do something. Id. at 652. Objecting to these comments, defense counsel argued that they shifted the burden of proof to the defendants. "We don't have any obligation to produce anyone," defense counsel declared. Id. Nonetheless, that objection was overruled. Id. During rebuttal, the prosecutor then stated: Ronald McNeil, folks. Here he is. Do you think defendants really wanted to hear from Ronald McNeil? This way they get to say, well, you know, all these wonderful nasty things about Mr. McNeil without Mr. McNeil ever being here. So here he is. He's right here. Defendants said we could have called McNeil, we could have called Collins, we could have called Tweaky Milspaw, we could have called Judy Berlin - another week of trial. Defendants probably could have called Lisa Miles (phonetic) and Lisa Miles's whole family to put them on at least on Fish's McCoy case - Wilson, at 653. Defense counsel objected again and that objection was also overruled. Id. On appeal, the defendants renewed their argument that the prosecutor's comments shifted the burden of production of evidence from the State to the defense. Wilson, at 654. The Court disagreed and held that "the State's closing argument did not shift the burden of persuasion" to the defendants, pointing out that "the case was not a close one and the evidence weighed heavily in the State's favor;" that the witness, upon whose failure to testify the State commented, "was not central to the case;" and that the State's rebuttal comments were "merely in response to defendants' closing arguments" and were therefore proper. Id. at 655. In Wilson v. State, one of the questions asked whether any member of the jury panel was unwilling or unable to abide by the rule that unless he or she was satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt based solely on the evidence, the presumption of innocence required them to find the defendant not guilty. Id. at 656. Another asked whether the juror would be able to decide the guilt or innocence of each defendant based solely on the evidence presented against that defendant. Id. The Court held that the questions "were not framed in a manner likely to expose biases, prejudices, or misconceptions of the jury panel." Id. at 659. Noting that those questions "more closely resemble jury instructions rather than voir dire questions," the Court followed the rule of Twining, holding that it was "inappropriate to instruct the jury on the law during voir dire or to question the jurors as to whether they would be disposed to follow or apply stated rules of law." Id. at 660.